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ABSTRACT 
Undergraduate enrollment increased over 50 percent nationally fix>m 1973 to 1994. The 
proportion of high school graduates enroUmg in college increased fiom 46.6 to 61.9 percent. 
These increases occurred despite increases in real tuition prices since 1985, constant 
(nominal) levels of federal Pell grants per recipient, and declining mmibers of high school 
graduates. This dissertation examines the admitted s^licant's decision to enroll and 
aggregate (state/county^) enrollment at a large public institution. 
The aggregate enrollment model investigates the extent to which national trends in 
enrollment can be cs^tured within the context of a model of enrollment demand at a specific 
university. State or national data sources do not allow sufficient time-series to test competing 
explanations for the increasing enrollment rates. A two stage process models the decision to 
attend a imiversity as the product of the probability of attending college and the probability of 
attending the specific institution, conditional on college attendance. 
Analysis of college enrollment aggregated to the state or county level reveals that 
increased per cqsita income and increased expected returns to higher education have played 
major roles in increasing college enroUments. These fiictors led to rising college enroUments, 
even as rising tuition lowered college incentives. The model finds fi«shmen enrollment is 
negatively related to price and distance, with an inelastic own-price response. 
The individual level model determines the ^ iplicant's reservation price. Four issues are 
discussed. 1) Can increases in tuition be ofiset with equal increases in grant aid? 2) Holding 
the probability of enrollment constant, how much must tuition increase to increase a desirable 
vn 
Student attribute (academic ability, protected group status)? 3) How can institutions 
maximize revenues by price discriminating and do th^r? 4) Based on computed reservation 
prices, what are the characteristics of the demand curve for the institution? 
The probit estimates reveal that the response to tuition is larger than grant aid and 
women, minorities, and high ability  ^students have higher reservation prices. The last dollar 
of grant aid decreases net revenue by more than one dollar and the institution is not 
maximizing revenue. Finally, the own-price elasticity in the individual level model is also 
inelastic. 
1 
CHAPTERl 
THE DEMAND FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 
Introdnction 
The decision to invest in a college education is both impoitant and complex. In the past 
20 years real tuition at public institutions increased nearly 50 percent The President's 
budget request for the federal Pell Grant Program in 1998 is S7.6 billion. This is more than 3 
times the 1980 allocation of $2.4 billion ( U.S. Department of Education, State Tables for 
Formula-Allocated and Selected Student Aid Programs, by Program Fiscal Year 1998, June 
1997). However, the average Pell Grant declined by more than $ 100 in real terms fix>m 1980 
to 1993. ^ Thus, the budget increase reflects an increase in the number of Pell grant recipients 
and not an increase in the size of the individual Pell Grant These factors lead to increased 
costs of attending college. la spite of the increased costs, the proportion of high school 
graduates going directly to college has increased from 46.6 to 61.9 percent and college 
enrollment has increased by more than 50 percent over the past 20 years (U.S. Department of 
Education, Digest of Education Statistics, 1996). 
The median salary of college graduates in 1995 was 85 percmt above the median salary 
of high school graduates. In 1973, the college wage premium was only 36 percent Topel 
(1997) and Katz and Muiphy (1992) examined the relationship between enrollment in higher 
education and the wage gap of college and high school graduates. Both use a straightforward 
' The average nominal Pell grant increased from 883 to 1,606 from 1980 to 1993. (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the US., 1996) 
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supply and demand fiamewoik, where changes in the relative supply of inputs (high skilled 
woikers relative to low skill workers) leads to declines in the relative wage Qiigh skilled 
wage over low skilled wage). Th  ^also ocamme changes in the relative demand for high 
versus low skilled labor. Changes in the relative demand for skilled labor are caused by 
biased technological change in production (toward high skilled jobs), changes in trade 
patterns (away ftom low-skilled jobs), and changes in consumer demand for "skill-intensive 
products". These p^ers found that the best explanation for the simultaneous increase in the 
college wage premium and the number of college graduates since the 1980s is that the growth 
in the demand for educated labor has been larger than the growth in the supply. 
There are important policy related questions regarding higher education at die state and 
federal level. The affordability of education is of particular interest at the federal level. 
Congress recently approved the President's '*Hope Scholarship", which provides a tuition tax 
credit for low and middle income families for the first two years of college education. As 
noted above the federal government spends over $7 billion on the Pell Grant Program, which 
targets grant dollars to low and middle income students. This does not include the federal 
woric-study or loan programs, which have even larger ^ ipropriations. William Bennett, 
former secretary of education, raised the issue that increases in federal support of higher 
education have merely allowed institutions to raise their prices (McPherson, Schapiro, and 
Winston, 1989). It is in^wrtant to understand the enrollment affects of these changes in 
federal support for higher education. If former Secretary Bennett is correct, the presumed 
increase in enroUment of low and middle income students fiom these policies is likely to be 
overstated. 
Individual institutions also have a keen interest in understanding the students' decision to 
enroll in college. In the face of restricted state and federal funding for higher education, the 
public institutions are under increased pressure to generate revenues fix)m tuition. Recent 
press reports indicate that a 3.9 percent increase in tuition at the Iowa Regents institutions 
will lead to an $8.1 million increase in tuition revenues ^ SU Daily. Sept 8, 1997). 
Presumably, the revenue calculations are based on some notion of the underlsring price 
elasticity of demand for higher education at the Regents schools. 
Universities may have objectives aside from increasing revenues fit>m tuition. Improving 
the educational environment by increasing the number of academically gifted students on 
campus, or increasing the enrollment of traditionally under-represented groins are two 
possible institutional goals. To achieve these goals, universities can engage in the strategic 
allocation of financial aid, to increase the probability that a certain type of student will 
enroll.^  It is important that the institution be well informed about the impact on revenue and 
enrollment finm changes in policy, such as an increase in price. It is also important that 
institutions understand how various groups are likely to respond to changes in the net price of 
attending college. 
Using the framework formalized by Becker (1964), this research examines the enrollment 
demand for a Midwest land grant institution, Iowa State University. Chs^ters 2 and 3 
examine aggregate first-time freshmen nonresident and resident enrollment at ISU, by state 
 ^See "Expensive Lesson: Colleges Manqnilate Financial Aid Offers, Shoitchangmg Many." The Wall Street 
Journal, A7, April 1,1996. 
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and county, respectively. Undergraduate enrollment and the number of admission 
applications are also examined to test the robustness of the first-time freshman enrollment 
results. Modeling the decision to enroll as a two stage process, the Actors that influence the 
decision to attend college are separated finm the &ctots that influence choosing to enroll at 
Iowa State. Recommendations for optimal tuition policies and their impact on revenues and 
enrollment are discussed. 
Chapter 4 presents a model of the individuals' decision to enroll at Iowa State. The 
empirical results are discussed in Chapter 5. Using admissions and financial aid records of 
admitted applicants, these chapters examine the &ctors that influence the probability of 
enrolling at ISU. Four questions are ocamined in light of the en:q>irical results. First, What is 
the students' response to a change in tuition vosus a change in financial aid? Next, the 
model gives insight into the cost of targeting specific characteristics. For example. What is 
the required change in scholarships to increase the ACT score by one at ISU, holding the 
probability of enrolling constant? Third, To what degree is the university using targeted aid 
to achieve their enrollment objectives? This question is examined by comparing revenue 
measures across student groups. Finally, the model determines the "a-level reservation 
scholarship", or the minimum scholarship necessary to set the probability of enrolling to at 
least a. The expected enrollment demand curve for the institution is mapped out using the 
individual's reservation price. 
The remainder of Chapter 1 is organized as follows. The next section presents some 
important trends in the demand for higher education. The third section in Chapter 1 provides 
5 
a brief literatuie review of the demand for higher education. 
Overview 
The decision to enroll in a particular college depends on several factors. Prospective 
students have many options: community colleges, 4-year schools in and outside their home 
state, private colleges, or work. Prospective college students and their parents consider the 
student's human capital acquired in elementary and secondary school, the quality of die post-
secondary institution, the family's resources, current information on returns to college, and 
the cost of attending the institution. Enrollment levels will be influenced by the individual 
factors mentioned above as well as by the population of potential college students. The latter 
is often measured by the size of the high school graduating class. This section discusses the 
time paths of these factors on a national level. The time paths specifically for ISU, the state 
of Iowa, and the states bordering Iowa are discussed in Qiapters 2 and 4. 
The national case 
The majority of undergraduate students enter college directly from high school. In 1993, 
62.3 percent of the U.S. undergraduates were under age 25 (U.S. Department of Education, 
Digest of Educational Statistics, 1995). The size of the high school graduating class is a 
good indicator of the potential size of the market for undergraduate education. Figure 1.1 
shows the national trend of public high school graduates. ^  Nationally, die high school 
graduating class peaked in 1976. The decline since then has been moderated somewhat by a 
decline in high school dropouts ftom 15.7 percent in 1973 to 12.7 percent in 1993 (U.S. 
 ^A consistent series for private and public high school graduates by state is not available. 
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Department of Conunerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States^  1995). Nevertheless, it is 
clear that colleges and imiversities have &ced declining maiket size as measured by new high 
school graduates. While nontraditional students represent a growing segment of the market, 
they may not make up for the decline in high school graduates. Increased college 
enrollments in the face of rising real tuition suggest that there must have been a dramatic 
outward shift in demand for college services that has counteracted the declines in supply of 
high school graduates. 
One factor that would lead to an outward shift in the demand for higher education is an 
increase in the returns to a college educatioiL Returns to college are measured by the ratio of 
median salary of college graduates to median salary of high school graduates. The time path 
of this ratio is shown in Figure 1.2. Clearly earnings from a college degree have grown fiister 
than earnings from a high school degree. The ratio of college to high school salaries has 
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increased from 1.36 in 1974 to just over 1.85 in 1995. This would be consistent with an 
upward shift in the demand for higher education in general. 
hicreases in income may also lead to increased enrollment, as more &niilies are able to 
pay tuition. National average per capita income was relatively stable firom 1973 to 1983, but 
has increased since then. As shown in Figure 1.3,1994 per c^ita income was 22 percent 
above the 1973 level. If higher education is a normal good, then an upward trend in income 
would cause an outward shift in the demand for higher education over time. Empirical 
research to date, reviewed in the next section, overwhehningly found positive income 
elasticities, supporting the presumption that investment in higher education is a normal good. 
Another factor that would lead to an increase in the number of students entering college is 
the degree of preparation provided at the primary and secondary levels. Schools with better 
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figure 1.3: National average real per c^ita income, 1973-1994 (in 1994 dollars). 
technology and better equipped teachers may produce better prepared students. These 
students may have less difficulty succeeding in college, and as a result, may be more likely to 
attend. The link between spending per pupil and achievement is debated in the literature on 
education production functions. For example, Hanushdc (1986,1996) argued that the 
correlation between per pupil spending and the quality of the education is weak. On the other 
hand, McPherson et al. (1993) indicated that expenditures may be an appropriate measure of 
school quality in some aggregate studies. C^ard and Knieger (1992,1996) also showed a link 
between dollars per pupil and lifetime earnings.^  Figure 1.4 shows that real per pupil 
spending on public elementary and secondary education (labeled primary) increased in IS of 
* Instead of per pupil spending. Card and Knieger (1992) use teachei/pupil ratios and average teacher salary as 
quality measures. 
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'iguie 1.4; Average of cunent fund expenditures per pupil in public elementary and 
secondary schools (by state). Average of current fiind expenditures in public institutions of 
higher education over the sum of the previous 4 years of Mgh school graduates (by state), 
1973 -1993. 
17 years between 1973 and 1990, before leveling off in the 1990s. The 1993 level is 
approximately 55 percent above the 1973 level. 
Expenditures at public institutions of higher education may also influence the demand for 
their services. An institution with better facilities, newer equipmoit, or more student services 
will be more attractive to prospective students. These state expenditures on public higher 
education are a subsidy for resident students. This subsidy can be viewed as being offered 
exclusively to residents because nonresident students face significantly higher tuition. Figure 
1.4 shows that state subsidies for hi^er education were relatively constant fiom 1973 to 
1982.^  Since 1982, the spending has increased dramatically, hi 1993, spending was 75 
 ^ This measuie is converted to "per pupil" by dividing current fund expenditures by the sum of 4 previous 
years of high school graduates. 
10 
percent above the 1973 level. The increased subsidy would also cause the demand curve for 
educational services to shift outward. 
Assuming the law of demand holds in the undergraduate education maricet, the price of 
obtaining a college degree would also have an impact on enrollment Figure 1.S shows 
average public 4-year tuition rates fix)m 1973 to 1995. The average U.S. resident real tuition 
fell 32 percent from 1973 to 1980. Since 1980, tuition has increased steadily and is currently 
27 percent above the 1973 level. 
First-time student enrollments at 4-year institutions in the U.S. are shown in Figure 1.6. 
The series has three peaks: 1975,1980, and 1988. First time student enrollment in 1992 is 
702,000, almost equal to 1973 level. For the purposes of this section, the most important 
characteristic about the pattern of first-time freshman enrollment is that it does not mimic the 
time path of high school graduates. First-time student enrollment is above the 1973 level for 
all years in the sample. However, the number of high school graduates has decreased since 
1977. Clearly, the number of first-time freshmen enrolling in college is being influenced by 
more than just demographics. The impacts of these factors on enrollment will be discussed at 
the aggregate level in Ch^ter 2 and at the individual level in Chapter 3. 
Review of Literature 
The economic study of investment in higher education was formalized by Gary Becker's 
Human Capital (1964). This provided a framework in which the decision to invest in 
training could be analyzed. Becker's model provides the theoretical framework for 
examining all types of human capital investment, from formal high school or college 
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education to on-the-job training. This review focuses on the choice to invest in formal 
training, specifically the decision to invest in higher education. 
The body of literature since Becker's semmal work is large and diverse. For this review, 
the literature is categorized into 2 groiq>s, those dealing with aggregate enrollment and those 
dealing with an individual's decision to enroll. The first group uses enrollment levels or 
proportions to examine national, state, or institutional enrollment The second group utilizes 
individual student data to examine the decision to invest in higher education. A common 
element in most of this literature is the effect of price and income on enrollment in higher 
educatioiL hi simplified form, most studies can be characterized with a regression model of 
the following form. 
E = + + + (1.1) 
where 
E - enrollment, or share of population enrolled 
T - tuition or cost of attending college 
I = family income 
X = vector of individual, economic, and/or institutional factors that influence enrollment 
e random error term 
Aggregate college enroUment literature 
This section reviews the empirical literature that examines the demand for higher 
education at an aggregate level. These smdies use actual enrollment or the share of 
enrollment as their dependent variable. Table 1.1 summarizes the price and income 
13 
Table 1.1: Price and lacome elasticities of aggregate studies of demand for higher education 
Study Period Method Type Price 
Elastici  ^
Income 
Elasticity 
National Enrollment Studies 
Campbell & 1919 - 64 linear 
Siegel regression 
(1967) 
Galper & 1919 - 64 distributed 
Dunn (1969) lag 
Hight 1927-72 
(1975) 
Kim (1987) 1958-82 
linear 
regression 
translog-
LES 
aI14yr -0.44 1.20 
institutions 
all institutions 0.69 
pubUc -1.058 0.977 
institutions 
national income -1.31 1.34 
accounts 
State Enrollment Studies 
Lehr & 1960 - 74 linear 
Newton regression 
(1978) 
Strickland et 1980 GLM 
al. (1984) 
Oregon 
Freshmen 
Virginia 
Freshmen 
-0.659 
-1.51 
1.88 
0.023 
Individaal Institation Studies 
Hoenack 
(1971) 
Hoenack & 
Weiler 
(1975) 
1967 
1948 - 72 
Chressanthis 1964 - 83 
(1986) 
Parker & 
Summers 
(1993) 
1988 - 90 
linear 
regression 
linear 
regression 
linear 
regression 
linear 
regression 
California 
Freshmen 
-0.85 
College of -1.2 
Liberal Arts 
Freshmen, MN 
SVSC freshmen -1.74 
82 selective -0.36 
liberal arts 
colleges 
> 0  
3.38 
14 
elasticities of the studies discussed here. EnroUment analysis at the national, state, and 
institutional levels are present in this section. 
National enrollment studies 
Early research on the demand for higher education nationally was conducted by Canqibell 
and Siegel (1967) and Galper and Dunn (1969). Campbell and Siegel (1967) examined the 
rate of retum to higher education. The model used in their analysis is straightforward. The 
enrollment ratio is a function of disposable household income and tuition. They estimated 
the own-price elasticity  ^of national college enrollment to be -0.44. Their income elasticity 
was 1.23. 
Galper and Dunn (1969) were primarily interested in estimating the impact of the GJ. bill 
and the size of the amied forces in general on college enrollments. Their reanalysis of 
Campbell and Siegel* s data yielded an income elasticity of 0.69. They found that &e size of 
the military negatively influenced college enrollments (elasticity of -026) and that the 
nxmiber of discharges was positively (elasticity 0.13) related to the enrollment rate over the 
period. Galper and Dunn (1969) also estimated the elasticity of college enrollments with 
respect to the high school graduates at 0.94. Thus, college enrollments move in near direct 
proportion to high school graduating class sizes. This siqipoits the notion that a good 
measure of the eligible population of college freshman would be the number of high school 
graduates. 
Corazzini, Dugan, and Giabowski (1972) examined the enrollment rate of high school 
graduates by state. They included four distinct tuition measures; junior college, public 
i 
15 
imiversity, teachers colleges, and private schools. They found that these four tuition 
measures negatively influence enrollment rates across most income quartiles. The three 
exceptions were teachers colleges for the second income quartile, and junior college and 
private college for the highest income quartile. The price coefficient for public institutions 
was 3 times larger than the response for private schools, -0.027 and -0.009, respectively. 
Th  ^state that the impact of a SlOO decrease in tuition in 1963 is associated with a 2.65 
percent increase in the nation's enrollment 
Corazzini et al. (1972) showed that the average education level of the father and the 
states' college enrollment rate are positively related. They include the unemployment rate as 
a proxy for the opportunity cost of attending college. Corazzini et al. found that the 
unemployment rate was negatively related with enrollment for the two lowest income 
qiiartiles and positively related for the two highest income quartiles. 
Hight (1975) examined enrollment in public and private institutions separately. Jackson 
and Weathersby (1975) report that the own-price elasticities estimated fix)m Hight (1975) 
were -1.058 and -0.64 for public and private institutions, respectively. He used tuition minus 
the average financial aid award for public and private colleges as the price of attending 
college. Using disposable family income he found the income elasticities of0.977 and 1.70 
for public and private schools, respectively. The cross-price efifects Q)ublic tuition for private 
enioUment and vice versa) were both positive. Thoefore, public and private school 
enrollment are substitutes for one another. 
Hopkins (1974) divided the impact of a tuition change into two parts, a substitution efifect 
16 
(students enroll in another college), and a discouragement effect (students do not emtsll). 
Hopkins examined the enrollment rates by state for the 1963 - 64 academic year. Consistent 
with economic theory and other literature, Hopkins found tiie own-price effects were negative 
for public and private enrollment, and the cross-price effects were positive. This indicates 
again that public and private school enrollment are substimte goods. He also found that 
public school enrollment was an inferior good but that private school enrollment was a 
normal good. 
Kim (1987) used national income accounts data fiom 1958 - 82. He estimated price and 
income elasticities for private spending on education. Kim found an elastic price response, 
-1.31, and an income elasticity of 134. 
McPherson and Schapiro (1991) examined enrollment across the United States to see if 
the goal of''promoting the enrollment of the less-afQuent students" has been achieved by 
targeted aid fiom the federal government (McPherson and Schq)iro, 1991. p.309). They 
examined enrollment rates of 6 subgroiq)s (3 income groups across public and private school 
enrollment) as well as differences in gender. The results were reported for whites only 
because of the small sample size of minority students in the CPS data series at their level of 
aggregation. They foimd that increases in the net cost of attending college had a negative and 
significant effect on enrollment rates of low-income students. McPherson and Sclu^iro also 
found that the enrollment rates of the high-income groups had not declined as a result of the 
increased college costs. There was not a significant gender effect on enrollment across the 
income groups, but the enrollment rate was about 5 percent higher for women than men. 
17 
State enrollment stodies 
Two studies used enrollment data restricted to a single state. Lehr and Newton (1978) 
examined fi^shmen enrollment in Oregon from I960 - 74. The explanatory variables used 
were tuition, per c^ita income, unemployment rate, size of the aimed forces and the number 
of high school graduates. The price elasticity  ^was -0.659, in the inelastic range. Oregon 
higher education was found to be a normal good, with an income elasticity of 1.88. 
Freshmen enrollment changed in ahnost direct proportion to the changes in high school 
graduates (elasticity 1.08). Lehr and Newton also found ttiat the unemployment rate and the 
size of the aimed forces had positive effects on freshmen enrollment 
Strickland, Bonomo, Mclaughlin, Montgomery, and Mahan (1984) examined 1980 
enrollment for the state of Virginia. The goal of their research was to explain the ratio of 
enrollment (enroUment over high school graduates) by geogr^hic area (county and city level 
analysis). Along with the usual price and income measures they also included the wage rate, 
the unemployment rate, and educational attainment of the area. The estimated price elasticity 
for all institutions was -1.51. The income elasticity was 0.023, but not statistically 
significant They hypothesized that the income effect enters the enrollment decision through 
the cost factors and that the income effect may be clouded by the educational attainment 
variables. 
Individual institation enrollment studies 
The final group of aggregate demand studies investigated enrollment at a specific 
institution. These include studies of enrollmoit demand at UCLA (Hoenack, 1971), the 
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Universiiy of Minnesota CHoenack and Weiler, 1975), and Saginaw Valley State College 
(Chressanthis, 1986). 
Hoenack (1971) reviewed the enrollment of California I£gh School graduates at UCLA. 
Since there was no variation in the price of enrolling across high schools, he used the 
distance fiom the high school to the main campus (UCLA) as a cost of enrolling in college. 
The price elasticity of the entire san^le was -0.85. The low income quartile had a price 
elasticity of -1.12, while the high income quartile had an inelastic response of -0.71. He 
noted that other California state colleges are close substitutes and that th  ^prices are 
correlated. Therefore, this elasticity represents the enrollment response of all institutions 
increasing price, and not the specific institution in isolation. 
Hoenack and Weiler (1975) examined the enrollment implications of a cost-related 
tuition policy at the Universi  ^of Minnesota. The time-series analysis at the University of 
Minnesota, College of LAeral Arts found that the demand was elastic, -1.2. They used the 
distance to each campus to account for variations in the price of attending, since the prices 
where highly correlated. This is a common problem among studies that examine enrollment 
at public institutions, since prices at several public institutions within a state are often set by a 
common governing body, such as a Board of Regents. 
Chressanthis (1986) examined enrollment at Saginaw VallQr State College, a public four* 
year school northwest of Detroit, Michigan. He included the usual regressors of tuition, 
income, and unonployment rate. He also included the prices of attending the other 
institutions in the area. The own-price elasticity  ^was rather large,-1.74. Enrollment in 
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SVSC had a very large income elasticity, 3.38. As Chressanthis stated, SVSC is located in 
an industrial manufacturing area, where higher education was traditionally less important 
because of the availability of blue collar jobs. The four cross-price effects in Chressanthis 
had mixed signs. Therefore, some institutions act as substitutes for SVSC (Michigan State 
University) and others as complements ^ elta College, a two-year community college). 
SVSC has a large number of juniors that transfo after their sophomore year at Delta College. 
Thus, as tuition at SVSC increased, more students choose to attend Delta College for the first 
two years instead of SVSC. 
Chressanthis (1986) examined the response to price as students progressed in school. He 
found that freshmen were the most responsive (-1.74) and that seniors were the least 
responsive (-0.59). The own-price elasticity for juniors was positive (0.45) and significant. 
Howev», this may be due to the large number of transfer students who enroll in SVSC after 
completing 2 years at Delta College. 
Finally, Parker and Summers (1993) examined the share of admitted ^ licants who 
choose to enroll at 82 selective colleges. Th  ^estimated separate equations for the groups of 
students who applied for financial aid and those who did not apply. Parker and Summers 
found negative elasticities of tuition and room and board for both groups. Their cost measure 
was the own-tuition relative to the average tuition at all 82 institutions. The elasticities for 
the aid and non-aid ^licants were -0.48 and -0.36, respectively. This indicates that students 
who ^ ly for financial aid are more sensitive to the price. Paricer and Summers used the 
SAT score as a quality measure. They found that the proportion of financial aid ^ licants 
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who enrolled was negatively related to the SAT score However, among those who did not 
^ly for financial aid, the share enrollmg was positively related with the SAT score. 
The aggregate studies of the demand for higho  ^education found negative price elasticities 
and positive income elasticities. The price elasticities are in both the elastic and inelastic 
ranges. However, there have been significant changes in the economic incentives to enter 
college, as addressed in the overview of this chs^ter and in work by Topel (1997) and Katz 
and Murphy (1992). The relationship between the recent increase enrollment and the 
changes in the incentives to attend college should be examined. 
Individnal's coUege enrollment decision 
The second section reviews studies of the decision to invest in higher education at an 
individual level. Typically, this group of empirical work uses discrete choice models to 
examine the enrollment decisioiL Much of the research uses longitudinal data or a survey 
specifically designed for the institution, ^^thin this groiq> two types of analysis radst, the 
decision to enroll an any institution, or the decision to enroll at a specific institution versus 
some alternative or set of alternatives. 
General college enrollment 
Manski and ^ ^e (1983) presented a 5 stage sequential model of the entire process of 
investing in higher education. This is an extremely comprehensive model of the college 
investment decision. The first stage examines the decision to apply for admission. Stages 2 
and 3 are made by the institution, admittance and financial aid. hi stage 4, the student 
decides at which institution (if any) to enroll. Finally, Manski and ^ se model the 
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persistence decision of the college student 
Manski and (1983) used the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class 
of 1972 (NLS_72) to test their modeL A few of their results are repeated here. These 
calculations hold all other characteristics fixed at the sample mean values. Th  ^found that 
the probability  ^of attending college increased fit>m 34 percent to 82 percent when the SAT 
score increased firom 700 to 1300 (with Rank = 100). Similarly, as class rank moved fix)m 25 
to 100 (with SAT = 1300) the probability of enrolling increased fiwm 43 percent to 82 
percent (See Table 1.6, Manski & ^ se, 1983, p. 6). lucreases in the parents income 
increased the probability of flying to college and die probability of enrolling, but 
decreased the probability of dropping out Manski and ^ ^e estimated the probability of 
enrolling and persisting in college across race and region. Minorities in the south had a 45 
percent and 68 percent probability of enrolling and persisting, respectively. Whites in the 
south were less likely to enroll (20 percent probability) and less likely to persist (42 percent) 
(See Table 1.9, Manski and Wise, 1983, p. 17). 
The price effects measured by Manski and Wise were reported as the change required to 
make the individual indifferent between the status quo and a $100 per month decrease in 
tuition. They found that tuition reductions were equivalent to: A reduction of equal size in 
scholarships, an increase of equal size in room and board fees, a decrease in expected labor 
force earnings of 2.5 times the change in tuition, and an increase in the average SAT score at 
the school when the student's score is above the average. "Also, a $100 per month decrease 
in tuition at a four-year college for a student whose family income is $10,000 is 
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approximately equivalent to a $300 per month decrease in tuition at a four-year college for an 
individual whose &mily income is $30,000 per year." ^ anski and Wise, 1983, p 20) 
Fuller, Manski, and )^se (1982) presented stage four of the above model; the college 
choice decision. The NLS_72 data allowed them to estimate a multinomial logit model with 
the following dependent variables: (i) all colleges to which the individual was admitted, (ii) 
open enrollment schools in the area, (iii) labor force participation, and (iv) military service, 
homemaking and part-time school/wotk alternatives. Th  ^found that the tuition of each 
institution had a negative impact on the probabili^  of choosing that alternative. The own-
price elasticity of enrollment was -0.23, given i^ lication and admission. Fuller et al. also 
estimated the impact of financial aid scholarships to be positive. 
Savoca (1990) examined the decision to ^ ly to college with the NLS_72 data. She 
included male and white dummy variables to account for the presence of afBrmative action in 
the probabili^  of being admitted. She states that 'in the presence of afQimative action 
efforts the probability of admission may be higher for a nonwhite or a female student." 
(Savoca, 1990. p 125) 
Savoca (1990) estimated that controlling for the probability of applying, the price 
elasticity was twice as large as previous work. She estimated the elastici^  of applying was 
-0.26. Taking the own-price elasticity of enrolling (-0.23), estimated by Fuller et aL (1982), 
Savoca indicated that the sum of these two elasticities (-0.49) would be the unconditional 
own-price elasticity. The income elasticity of the application decision was positive and 
relatively small (0.24). 
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Weiler (1996) utilized data from the 1993 '^ College Board Admitted Student 
Questionnaire Plus" to study the enrollment choices of high abili^  students. The survey 
provides student rankings of at least two colleges where the student was admitted. It also 
includes socioeconomic data such as gender, ethnid ,^ family income, home address and 
SAT score. As in Savoca (1990), Weiler included dummy variables for males and minorities. 
Weiler found that smdents place equal weight on the academic and non-academic 
considerations in the enrollment process. These non-academic factors include such items as 
availability of housing and recreation facilities Instead of including a net price, Weiler 
included the student's opinion regarding the price at the institution. As would be expected, if 
the student indicated the net price was high, th^r were much less likely to enroll. If the 
respondent indicated costs were moderate, the impact was still negative, but smaller in 
magnitude. The models reported in the text did not include the race, gender, or financial aid 
variables. 
Specific college enrollment 
The second group of literature »amining the individual's decision to enroll in college 
focuses on enrollment at a particular institution. The two p^^ers presented here examined the 
individual's enrollment behavior at a selective imiversity. Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) 
examined the decision to enroll at Comell University. Moore, Studenmund, and Slobko 
(1991) replicate the previous model with data finm Occidental College. 
Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) examined 1981 freshmen enrollment at Comell 
University. The data used in their analysis came from admission and financial aid 
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applications, as well as a survey mailed to all admitted ^ licants. This survey gathered data 
on the other colleges the student was admitted and the &iancial aid offered by these 
competing colleges. 
A "selective university'* is defined by Ehrenberg and Shennan as an institution where the 
number of applications for admission far exceed the number of available positions. They 
reported that admission rates at Cornell were approximately 25 percent Ehrenberg and 
Sherman modeled the university behavior with a utility function that depends on the number 
of quality units fix)m each sub-group of enrolled students. A quality unit is defined as the 
product of the number of admitted applicants, the probability of enrolling (which is an 
increasing fimction of the share of costs paid by the university), and the quality of the group 
of admitted applicants (i.e. academic ability measures such as SAT or class rank, which 
decrease with the number of students admitted). The general form of the utility function 
allows the quality units fiom each groiq) to be weighted to reflect the preferences of the 
institution. The subgroups included in their model were defined by ethnicity, gender, income 
class, and being the relative of an alumnus. 
Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) used probit analysis to determine the probability of the 
individual enrolling at Cornell University. Briefly, they found that males were less likely 
than females to enroll. Similarly, minorities were less apt to enroll. Iftheqiplicanthada 
parent, grandparent, or sibling who attended Cornell, they were also less likely to enroll. 
Ehrenberg and Sherman found that as distance to Cornell increases students were less likely 
to enroll. Finally, if the best alternative school listed by the q)plicants' survey response was 
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an Ivy league school, the student was less likely to enroll. 
They discuss six propositions regarding the financial aid policies of the institution. Two 
are relevant to the current research. First, groups that ate more desired by the university 
should be given a lower net price. Second, groups that are more likely to enroll should be 
charged a higher price. 
Their results '^ mambiguously suggest" that the high ability students should be charged a 
lower net price. Among other things, the high ability group tended to have a lower 
propensity to enroll. Their results supported the notion that minority students should receive 
larger aid packages, other things equal, "because, in addition to being relatively attractive to 
the university, minorities have a lower propensity to enroll and a higher elasticity of average 
quality" (Ehrenberg and Sherman, 1984. p 224). However, minorities did have a lower 
elasticity of yield, so the policy of a larger financial aid offer was not unambiguously 
supported. The elasticity of enrollment with respect to the net price was -1.09 in Comell's 
private school and -0.28 in the public school. 
Moore et al. (1991) applied the Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) framework to data fit)m 
the 1989 ^ plicant pool at Occidental College, a selective liberal arts college. Th  ^also had 
a survey which provided data on the other schools where the student was admitted. They 
used the logit model to examine the probability of enrolling at Occidental against the best 
alternative listed on the survey. Moore et aL found the price elasticity over all ^ licants was 
-0.72. Their results indicated that minorities and females were more likely to enroll, and that 
increases in income were negatively related to the probability of enrolling. 
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The sensitivity to net price was estimated by Moore et al. (1991) across parental income, 
academic abili^ , and ethnic groups. The own-price elasticity became more elastic as income 
increased in all but the highest income groiqi. The own-price elasticity increased from the 
lowest to the middle range of academic ability, but declined as academic ability moved above 
the mid-range. The elasticities for minorities and non-minorities were -0.18 and -0.87, 
respectively. 
Moore et al. (1991) extended the Ehrenberg & Sherman (1984) framework by examining 
the group of students that did not ^ ly for financial aid. Th  ^found that the own-price 
elasticity for this group was much smaller (-0.3S) than the group that did ^ ly for financial 
aid. Within the group of students who did not £ l^y for aid, the price elasticity did not vary 
across minorities or whites. The students with higher academic ability were more responsive 
to price. 
A financial aid package is made up of a combination of scholarships, loans, and work 
study fimds. Moore et al. (1991) tested for different responses to each type of financial aid. 
They found that the probability of enrolling respond positively to scholarships, but loans and 
work-study opportunities had a much smaller effect on the probability of enrollment They 
noted that if the federal government continues the shift from grant to loan aid, the institutions 
would be likely to come up with larger scholarship fimds to target their desired students. 
Sninmary 
The consensus of the literature is that higher education has negative own-price elasticities 
and positive income elasticities. This is consistent with the theoretical framework developed 
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by Becker (1964) and used in most subsequent research. There is not a consensus on the 
magnitude of the enroUment impact from a price change. la the aggregate empirical research 
examined here, 4 of the 9 studies had inelastic own-price responses. M the studies of an 
individual's college decision, most of the studies found an inelastic price response. However, 
Cornell Universities' public school had an elastics response ^ hrenberg and Sherman, 1984). 
The income elastici^  is much the same. The conclusion can be drawn that higher education 
is a nomial good, however, there is no clear evidence that it is a necessity or luxury good. 
The current research fills several g£^s in the literature. The studies of a student emolling 
at a specific institution (Ehrenberg and Sherman, 1984 and Moore et al. 1991) examined 
"selective" universities. The institution examined in this research is a large public institution, 
with a comparatively open emx)llment policy. Iowa State University admits nearly 75 percent 
of the applicants. Chapters 4 and 5 study enrollment at Iowa State University from 1976 to 
1994, the two papers mentioned above used enrollment records for a single year. 
The individual level analysis also provides a method of examining institutional 
enrollment without a survey of the admitted students. While there is certainly valuable 
information that can be gathered fit>m such a survQr, it is cosdy to undertake. This research 
examines if a model of enrollment behavior can be consistent with economic theory and 
previous research without the beneficial, but costly surv .^ 
The current aggregate research is also both time-series and cross-sectional. Previous 
work examined does not allow cross-sectional variation, since enrollment was aggregated to 
the national, state, or institutional level. The current aggregate work ocamines enrollment 
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from 49 states and 99 comities over a 20 year period. The current research tracks the 
enroUment unpact of increased returns to college, increased &niily income, increased real 
tuition, and declining high school graduating class sizes over the past 20 years. National 
emx)llment effects are separated from the institution specific effects using the two stage 
decision process in Ch t^er 2. 
This research provides an up-to-date study of aggregate enrollment at an individual 
institution. The nunber of students enrolled at ISU from a state or coun  ^are examined from 
1973 - 93. While the previous empirical research on ^ gregate enroUment did study large 
public institutions, they did not make special consideration of the large differences in tuition 
between resident and nonresidrait students. Nonresident tuition at ISU is 3 times die resident 
rate. The dramatic difference in price indicates that resident and nonresident enrollment are 
separate madeets. The current research provides separate analysis of resident and nonresident 
enrollment 
The purpose of this research is to deteimine the effect of the factors tiiat influence 
enrollment, using data for a large public university. Specifically, the response to tuition and 
scholarships are of interest, since they are frequently choice variables of institutions. The 
response to a change in tuition is examined at the aggregate level and the individual level. 
The implications of this research, while of interest to administration officials at Iowa 
State University, are usefiil to those outside ISU. Like ISU, universities across the nation 
face declining high school graduating classes and increased pressure to generate revenues 
from tuition. The results from this study should not be used in specific policy 
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recommendatioiis for institutions other than ISU. However, the general findings presented 
here aid in our understanding of the enroUment trends aver the past 20 years. Together with 
previous research, this work adds to the understanding of the &ctors that influence the 
demand for higher education. 
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C:HAPTER2 
EXPLANATIONS FOR RISING FIRST-TIME STUDENT ENROLLMENTS, 
1973-1994: EXTRACTING NATIONAL INFLUENCES FROM LOCAL DEMAND 
Iowa State ocperienced increasing undergraduate enrollments fiom 16,605 in 1973 to 
21,657 in 1985. Since then, enrollments have ^ en to 18,949 in 1995. Increased 
enrollments occurred, despite a decrease in high school graduates of 20 percent nationally 
and despite a 63 percent increase in real nonresident tuition. Yet in the face of increased 
costs and declines in the size of the potential market, ISU has been able to modestly increase 
total enrollment by 15 percent (Iowa State University, Enrollment Services Annual Statistical 
Report, 1973 -1995). 
Nationally college enrollment has been increasing over the past 20 years, as noted in 
Ch t^er 1. This ch t^er presents a two stage theoretical model of college enrollment for a 
single institution. It is plausible that the increased enrollments are in response to rising rates 
of return to college education and increases in real family income over the period. This 
chapter investigates the extent to which national trends in enrollment can be captured within 
the context of a model of enrollment demand at a specific university. It also illustrates the 
impact of university tuition policies on enrollment 
These questions are addressed, using data from Iowa State University. The focus on a 
single university is necessary because of the lack of consistent time series data on first-time 
freshman enrollment by state. While data are available at the national level, such aggregate 
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data make it difficult to distinguisli demand-side finm siq>ply-side responses or to distinguish 
among competing trend variables for explanatory power. 
Iowa State Universi^ , as most public universities, faces two madcets for undergraduate 
educatioiL Nonresident and resident enrollment behave as different goods. The price 
charged to each group is the most significant indicator that these markets are distinct. The 
1994 resident tuition at ISU is S2,471, while nonresidents were charged $7,731. Therefore, 
each market is analyzed separately. Ch t^er 2 contains the empirical results for nonresident 
enrollment by state. Giapter 3 presents the county enrollmmt model for residoit students at 
ISU. 
Iowa State might be gaining enrollment from the increased share of students enrolling in 
college nationally, may be "stealing'* potential students away from other institutions or even 
losing students to other institutions because of the relative increase in tuition at ISU. To 
address these questions, this paper examines first-time student enrollment, undergraduate 
enrollment, and applicants for admission for the 49 states and 99 counties of Iowa from 1973 
to 1994. 
Overview: The Iowa Case 
This section reviews the time trends of some of the &ctors that influence the demand for 
higher education, as was presented in Chapter 1. However, it is useful to examine the Iowa 
State University enrollment experience in light of the trends in Iowa, the surrounding states, 
and the nation. Resident students make iq> 77 percent of the undergraduate populatiotL The 
nonresident students from the U.S. account for 17 percent of the undergraduates. 
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Nonresident demand for Iowa State is disproportionately fiom the Midwest Only 22 percent 
of U.S. nonresident students at ISU come fiom states that do not border Iowa, and Illinois 
alone accounts for 43 percent of nonresident freshmen. The new undergraduate students at 
Iowa State are predominately (68 percent) made iq> of students who entered the year 
following high school graduation. Only 13 percent of the undergraduates are over age 25 
(ISU Annual Statistical Report, Fall 1995). Therefore, the size of the high school graduating 
class is a good indicator not only of college enrollment nationally but of the potential size of 
the undergraduate enrollment at Iowa State. 
Figure 2.1 shows the paths of public high school graduating class sizes for Iowa, states 
that border Iowa and the United States. ^ The decline in graduating class sizes in Iowa and its 
surrounding states is even steeper than the national trend. In 1973, the Iowa high school 
graduating class peaked at 44,521. The 1996 Iowa high school graduating class was nearly 
30 percent lower. The states that border Iowa have a time trend diat lies between the national 
and Iowa trend. 
In 1975, Iowa real per capita income had decreased 15 percent, relative to 1973 (Figure 
2.2). 1983, per c i^ta income was again 15 percent below 1973. The 1994 per capita 
income, following a steady increase from 1983, is 7 percent above the 1973 level. If higher 
education is a normal good, then an upward trend in income would cause an outward shift in 
the demand for higher education over time. 
As was true nationally, the real price of tuition rose at Iowa State University  ^over the 
' The national time-series are repeated in these graphs for comparative purposes. 
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period. The time paths of resident and nonresident tuition at ISU are compared with average 
resident tuition in the border states and the nation as a whole figure 23). Nonresident 
tuition at ISU has risen &ster than resident tuition in the surrounding states and in the nation 
as a whole. The price of ISU nonresident tuition began to increase fiister in 1983, and has 
continued at the increased rate thereafter, aside finm a slight leveling in 1990. The 1994 
level, in real dollars, is 64 percent above the 1973 level. 
Resident tuition at ISU followed a similar pattern, filing until 1980, then steadily 
increasing, although at a lower rate than even die national average, to 16 percent above the 
1973 level. Many studies have verified a negative relationship between tuition and 
enrollment The six papers that examined enrollment at a state or institutional level of 
aggregation, found elasticities of -0.36 and -1.74.^  
That Iowa State &ced a larger than average decline in high school graduates, even as it 
increased its relative price of tuition would suggest declining enrollments, other things equal. 
First-time freshmen enrollments should be particularly sensitive to changing tuition. Upper 
class students face higher costs (in temis of lost credit hours and increased time to 
graduation) if diey transfer, and so are less likely to respond to changing prices. For 
example, Chressanthis (1986) found that the demand elasticity for freshmen was -1.74, but 
only -0.589 for seniors. 
Figure 2.4 shows the time paths of Iowa State first-time fi:eshmen resident and 
nonresident enrollments for the United States and the states that border Iowa. First-time 
resident freshmen enrollment is relatively constant over the san:q)le despite the 30 percent 
 ^Table 1.1 reports the price and income elasticities of each of the six papers. 
35 
1.8 
1.6 .. 
1.4 .. 
1.2 .. 
r~ 
1 .. 
g 
w > 0.8 .. 
a 
& 0.6 .. 
0.4 .. 
0.2 .. 
0 
. Nattonal Resident 
. Border Resideiit 
. Io«B Nonresident 
.low Resident 
1972 1996 
1973: National 2,060, Border = 1,694, low Nonresident >4,723, Io«« Resident" 2,127 (1994 doOars) 
Figure 2.3: Real national average resident tuition, real average resident tuition of states that 
border Iowa, ISU resident tuition, and ISU nonresident tuition, 1973-1994 (in 1994 doUars). 
2.25 
2 A 
1.75 . / \ 
m 
2 1.5 . P \ R Q P J p \ \ J\ —0_ Nonresuient 
1.25 . 
£ rAjS V e/A —Q. Border 
'5 ei \f a V —^ Iov« 
1 . 
0.75 . 
0.5 
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 
Year 
1973: Nonresident * 970, Border634, lo'W 4,073 
'igure 2.4: First-time emoUment at Iowa State University: resident, nonresident, and border 
states, 1973-1995. 
36 
drop in Iowa high school graduates since 1973. Nonresident first-time student enrollments at 
ISU have a maricedly different pattern. The largest increase, in percentage temis, occurred in 
the states that border Iowa. Despite declining high school graduating classes, nonresident 
enrollment actually grew until 1983. The downtum in nonresident enrollment coincides with 
the 1983 increase in nonresident tuition relative to resident tuition elsewhere. The deviation 
between freshmen resident and nonresident enrollment at Iowa State suggests that 
nonresident enrollments at ISU may be responding to some of the same factors that are 
altering college enrollments nationally, even though tuition policies and other local factors 
may cause ISU enrollments to deviate &om national trends. 
Economic Model 
This chapter uses a two-stage process to model the decision to invest in higher educatiotL 
Prospective college students compare utility from available alternatives. In the first stage, an 
individual chooses whether or not to attend college. In stage two, conditional on choosing 
college, the individual selects which college to attend. 
Two stage model of college enrollment 
The model uses the following notation 
= Current &mily income 
= Expected future income with a college education 
= Expected future income with a high school education 
Quali^  of primary (elementary and secondary ) education 
N = Eligible population of college students 
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= Direct price of attending Iowa State University 
D =Distance to Iowa State University 
= Direct price of attending a college other than ISU 
P** = Direct price of attending a private college or university 
= State provided subsidy for public higher education 
T = Tastes, preferences 
The first stage decision involves the choice of whether to attend college or enter the labor 
force. Consider two indirect utility fimctions: 
The individual's utility fix>m entering the labor force (Ulf) is increasing in the expected 
attending college (Uc) is positively related to fiiture anticipated income, current family 
income, and the quality of primary education. Family income lowers the cost of financing a 
college education, while better primary and secondary schools are assumed to increase the 
efficiency of the human coital production process in college. The utility of attending 
college is negatively related to the direct price of attending a college (at both public and 
private institutions) and positively related to the per capita state college subsidy. 
The individual will choose to invest in higher education if the utility fix)m attending 
college is greater than the utility fiom entering the labor force. This can be written as 
U^=U(Y^rI) 
Uc = U(Y^Y^P^S^P^Q^r,) (2.1) 
income from entering the labor force directly from high school (Y^). The utility fix>m 
(2.2) 
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where the probability of attoiding college (Pr(Q) depends positively on future earnings fiom 
college, current family income, public higher education subsidy, quality of primary 
education, and tastes for college; and depends negatively on future earnings finm high 
school, the price of attending college (public or private), and tastes for labor force 
participation after high school. 
Conditional on college being chosen, the n«ct decision is which college to attend. The 
goal of this model is to explain enrollment at a particular institution, so the school choice is 
subdivided into attending the representative institution or attending any other institution. The 
choice is made by comparing the utilities from available alternatives. 
= U(Y^Y^P~,D,Q^r™) 
U, =U(Y^Y^P^S^P^Q^r=) 
The indirect utility fix>m attending Iowa State (!!„„) is increasing in future expected income, 
current &mily income, quality of primary education, and the tastes for ISU. Utility is 
decreasing in the cost of attending ISU. The two measures of costs are tuition and distance. 
If the utility of attending ISU is greater than the utility of the other available alternatives, the 
individual will choose to make his/her human cs i^tal investment at Iowa State. 
If the utility of income fiom attending ISU is equal to the utility of income fix>m attending 
another college, then the conditional probability of selecting ISU will not be affected by 
college income. Similar arguments for family income and quality of primary education 
suggest that these fetors will not affect the ISU choice conditional on attending college. 
Therefore, the conditional probability of attending Iowa State can be written in reduced form 
as 
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PrdSUlQ = Pr(U  ^a UJ = g(P; ,Q . <;). (2.4) 
(-) (-) (+) (-) W W (-) 
The unconditional piobabili^  of an individual enrolling at ISU is the product of the 
conditional probabiliQr of attending ISU and the unconditional probability of attending 
college, or 
PrOSU) = Pi(C) PrOSUlC) = fl:) gO). (2.5) 
Suppose that equations (2.2) and (2.4) are of the fonn Pr(C) = W®' X"  ^ and 
Pr(ISUjQ = respectively. Let W represent the variables common to equations 
(2.2) and (2.4), X represent the variables only entering equation (2.2), and Z represent the 
variables only entering equation (2.4). Then the unconditional probability of enrolling at ISU 
wiUbe 
Pr(ISU) = (2.6) 
The signs of variables in X and Z can be established immediately, whereas the signs of the 
variables in W depend on the signs and magnitudes of ai and Yi. Using (2.2), (2.4), (2.5), 
and the assumed Cobb-Douglas functional fonns, we have the following predicted signs 
Pr(ISU) = (2-7) 
(+) (+) (-) (-) C?) C?) 0)  ^(-) (•••) (-) CD 
The individual's decision to enroll at ISU is modeled as depending positively on future 
income &om college, family income, quality of primaiy school education, and the tastes for 
ISU. The enrollment decision is negatively related to the price of attending the particular 
school, future income with a high school degree, distance, and the tastes for entering the 
labor force directly finm high school. Four Actors Q)ublic and private college prices, the 
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local subsidy for public higher education, and the tastes for other schools) enter positively in 
the probability of enrolling in college, but negatively in the conditional probability  ^of 
enrolling in the representative institution. Therefore the predicted effect is ambiguous. ^  The 
next section specifies &e econometric model for nonresident iBrst-time student enrollment. 
The model for resident enrollment is presented in the following chapter. Both of these 
models will test predictions regarding the coefScients as well as provide information on the 
effects of which variables for which the theoiy generated ambiguous predictions. 
Econometric model for nonresident enrollment 
The econometric model imposes the Cobb-Douglas specification in log form. Table 2.1 
summarizes the variables used in the econometric model.^  The observed probability of 
attending ISU is the number of first-time freshmen from state s and year t, divided by the 
number of high school graduates in the state, Ns.t, or ——. Taking logs and moving log(N, J 
N 
to the right-hand side, we get first-time nonresident enrollment as a fimction of the previously 
discussed variables and the size of the eligible population 
to(E„) = A + /Y.>')+o,lii(Q;.)+r, ln(N„) +r, ta(P/-) (Z>o) 
+r6ln(D,)+r7ln(r^t)++^,hi(S^,)+Aln(t) + 
where P = a-Hy. The analysis covers 49 states and 20 years. Three dependent variables are 
examined, first-time nonresident student enrollment, nonresident undergraduate enrollment. 
 ^ A fiuther difficulty in using ibe private school price is that a diird college price leads to correlation among die 
regressors. The single correlation between national average private school tuition and ISU nonresident tuition 
is 0.994. Therefore, private school tuition is not mcluded in die empirical modeL 
 ^The appendix has a detailed discussion of the variables, including sources of die data used in the analysis. 
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Table 2.1: Brief definitions of variables used m the nonresident enrollment analysis. 
Variable Definition: (variables are by state and year, unless noted) 
Dependent Variable CEt,t) 
First-time Freshmen Iowa State University  ^new &11 freshmen enrollment 
Undergraduate Enrollment Iowa State University  ^total undergraduate enrollment 
Applications 
Independent Variables 
N 
pisu 
D 
Iowa State University applications for admission 
real income per cq>ita in the home state 
national average annual income of males with 4 yrs. of college 
(high school) as highest degree completed 
real current flmd expoiditures per pupil in average daily 
attendance at public elementary and secondary school in home 
state 
number of high school graduates 
real Iowa State University  ^annual nonresident tuition 
distance from Ames, Iowa to the nearest border of the home 
state (by state) 
number of Iowa State alumni living in each state, proxy for 
local ties to ISU 
real annual tuition and fees at public 4-year institutions in the 
home state 
real current firnd expenditures on public institutions of higher 
education over sum of previous 4 years of high school 
graduates (in the home state) 
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and the number of nonresident plications for admission to Iowa State University. 
The variables that enter the probability  ^of enrolling only through equation (2.2), include 
family income, relative salary and the quality of primary education. Family income is an 
indicator of ability to pay. If higher education is a normal good, mcreases in income would 
increase enrollment The ratio of expected college salary over expected high school salary 
captures the expected increase in income fix>m a college degree. This concept was formalized 
by Gary Becker (1964). Real spending per piq>il in public elementary and secondary schools 
is used to proxy the quality of training that the state provides at that level. 
In addition, the number of high school graduates &om each state enters the analysis as a 
measure of the eligible population. The coefBcient on ln(Ns,t) should be one if high school 
graduates represent a homogenous population. However, if an increase in the population of 
high school graduates going to college implies selecting fiom a different distribution of 
students at the margin, the changes in enrollment may not be proportional to the changes in 
high school graduates. For example, presimiably the students finishing high school and 
going to college come disproportionately from high ability students. Those students on the 
margin of labor force participation versus college come disproportionately from the middle 
and lower-tail of the ability distribution. These middle and lower ability students may be less 
willing to pay nonresident fees to attend an institution outside their home state. Since 
changes in the number of high school graduates in this period come from both lower drop-out 
rates and population declines, the population of high school graduates may be adding more of 
these middle or lower abihty students relative to the high ability students. 
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The price of attending ISU is the nonresident ISU tuition divided by the consumer price 
index. The other cost of attending ISU is distance finm the home state. The distance from 
ISU is included as a measure of both the physical and psychic distance fiom home. A trip 
home is more expensive, in both time and direct cost of travel, if the smdent is farther away. 
The number of ISU alumni in each state and year is included as a proxy of tastes for ISU. 
Alumni have personal experience with the campus and can communicate their recollections 
to prospective students in the area. These are the variables that affect ISU enrollment 
through the conditional demand equation (2.4). 
Assuming that pubUc 4-year institutions in the home state are substitutes for ISU, the 
own-state price is defined as the average resident tuition at the home state public universities. 
These costs are less important the more the home state provides subsidies to its resident 
students. Expenditures on higher education in the home state per high school graduate from 
the previous four years is the measure of the subsidy that a state provides its in-state students. 
The final temi in the empirical model is a logarithmic time trend that ca|)tures the impact 
of the national or general college enrollment demand factors at the specific institution over 
the sample. A positive sign would indicate that ISU has captured an increasing share of 
national enrollment over the sanq>le period. 
Empirical Analysis of Nonresident Enrollment by State 
The variation of the logarithm of nonresident enrollment by state was first analyzed using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).^  Durban-Watson tests on the OLS specification indicated the 
 ^The drawback of die log specificatioa is that some states may generate no new fall enroUees at ISU m some 
years. Therefore, log (ISU enrollment + O.I) was used. 
44 
presence of autocoirelated errors. The Maximiim Likelihood Estimator (MLE), first 
suggested by Cochrane and Orcutt (1949), was used to generate the estimates reported herein. 
The coefficients of the regression are interpretable as elasticities. The elasticities reveal the 
percentage inq)act on nonresident enrollment or plications fix>m a one percent change in an 
independent variable. 
First-time nonresident freshmen enrollment regression results 
The MLE coefBcients for first-time nonresident fieshman enrollment at ISU are presented 
in Table 2.2. The results and implications are discussed below. 
The first 4 variables appear only in the decision to go to college. The income elasticity is 
positive and significant A10 percent increase in family income causes an estimated 16 
percent increase in nonresident first-time fi«shmen enrollment This suggests that 
nonresident enrollments are procyclical, rising during expansions and contracting during 
recessions. The positive relationship between income and the level of enrollment verifies 
that ISU nonresident enrollment is a nomial good. 
The expected returns to college education have a positive effect on enrollments, but the 
coefiScient is not significant at the 10 percent level. While the estimate is inqirecise, it 
implies that a 10 percent increase in the returns to college increases nonresident enrollments 
by 16 percent 
State expenditures on primary and secondary education have a positive and significant 
impact on nonresident enrollments jfrom that state. The elasticity implies that a 10 percent 
increase in per pupil primaiy and secondary expenditures increase ISU nonresident 
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Table 2.2: MLE regression coefScients for fiill san l^e (49 States), 1973-1993 Gog-log 
specification) 
CoefScient Fust-time Undergraduate Applications 
Freshmen Enrollment 
Intercept -7.670*« -1.079 -L864*» 
(-2.67) (-1.27) (-2.07) 
Hicome per c i^ta 1.655*** 1.296*» 1.435** 
(2.62) (2.52) (2.47) 
College over High 1.684 1.047 -0.694 
School Salary (1.02) (LOO) (-0.70) 
Primary spending 0.942*»» 0,651** 0.254 
(2.59) (2.11) (0.75) 
High school -0.300*** -0.168 0.006 
graduates (-2.98) (-1.25) (0.04) 
ISU nonresidCT t^ .0.971« .0.723*» -0.648** 
tuition (-2.18) (-2.19) (-2.15) 
Distance -0.913*** -L018*** -0.910*** 
(-6.86) (-5.84) (-5.20) 
Alumni 1.141«* 0.920**» 0.755*** 
(10.77) (7.04) (5.78) 
Resident tuition 0234 0.109 0.328** 
(1.55) (0.79) (2.30) 
State subsidy -0.650*** -0.097 0.384*** 
(-3.08) (-0.58) (2.61) 
Time trend -0.937*** -1.221* -0.322 
(-3.23) (-1.95) (-0.41) 
n 980 980 780 
R-squared 0.6775 0.8885 0.8950 
MSE 1.252 0.345 0.242 
() t-ratios 
significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent 
' 1976 - 1993 
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emoUments by 9.4 percent 
The decline in the number of high school graduates have not adversely affected college 
enrollments. &i &ct, the literal interpretation of the estimated effect is that decreases in the 
number of high school graduates over the poiod actually led to an increase in nonresident 
enrollment, other things equal. As previously discussed, the coefQdent of this variable is 
expected to be I, if the high school graduating population were homogeneous. The 
coefBcient is not only less than one, but negative. The coefScient supports the explanation 
that the high school classes are increasing in the low and middle ability ranges, rather than 
the high abili^ . These low and middle abili^  students would be less like to attend an out-of-
state institution, since the tuition alone is significantly higher than the in-state institutions 
that are available. 
The next three variables only appear in the conditional demand of choosing which college 
to attend, equation (2.4). The own-price elasticity  ^of demand is significant and marginally in 
the inelastic range. The elasticities of tuition with respect to first-time nonresident student 
enrollment at Iowa State is estimated to be -0.971. A10 percent increase in nonresident 
tuition leads to a 9.7 percent decrease in nonresident enrollment yielding a very modest 
increase in revenues. Statistical tests for unit elasticity cannot be rqected, indicating that 
nonresident tuition at ISU is at the revenue maximizing level. The implication of this result 
is discussed later in this ch£q)ter. 
Another cost of attending Iowa State is the distance to ISU. Distance from Ames, Iowa 
has a negative and significant effect on first-time nonresident freshmen enrollments. States 
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farther fiom Ames tend to have fewer fi«shmen attending ISU. The number of alumni in a 
state has a positive and significant effect on first-time nonresident enrollment, indicating that 
those states with more alumni tend to have larger noniesidoit fi«shmen enrollments. 
The last two variables enter in both the decision to go to college and the conditional 
decision to attend Iowa State. The signs indicate the relative magnitudes of a and p. The 
coefficient on the price of the in-state institution is positive but not significant This indicates 
that increases in the resident tuition of other states lead to modest increases in nonresident 
fireshmen enrollments at ISU. Since the coefficient is not significantly different fix)m zero, 
the magnitudes of a and P are ^ arently equal. The negative sign also indicates that the 
own-state public schools are substitutes for nonresident ISU enrollment 
The home state subsidy of resident public higher education has a negative and significant 
effect on ISU nonresident enrollments. The impact of local spending on higher education is 
stronger for the conditional decision of attending ISU then the decision to go to college. 
Thus, larger spending on higher education in the home state results in smaller nonresident 
fi-eshmen enrollment at ISU from that state. 
In review, the number of first-time nonresident fireshmen enrolled at Iowa State is 
positively related to family income, own-state resident tuition, number of ISU alumni, own-
state spending on primary education, and oqiected returns from a college degree. These 
enrollments are negatively related to ISU nonresident tuition, distance from Ames, own-state 
subsidy for higher education, and high school graduating class size. 
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Total undergradoate enrollment and applications 
The robustness of the results above is tested by regressing ISU nonresident undergraduate 
enrollment and nonresident plications for admission to ISU on the same set of explanatory 
variables. These regressions should yield similar results, racept that the elasticities should be 
smaller in magnitude for total undergraduate nonresident enrollment Those already 
attending ISU should be less price and income sensitive than entering freshmen because of 
the higher cost of transfer relative to selecting a school. .^ ipUcations should also be less 
price sensitive because the cost of an plication is much lower than the cost of enrollment. 
The results in Table 2.2 confirm these expectations. The findings are similar to the first-time 
nonresident freshmen enrollment regression. The signs are identical in the undergraduate 
enrollment regression and in 6 of the 9 coef5cients in the plications model. Moreover, the 
own-price elasticities are smaller in magnitude relative to those in column I. 
Nonresident undergraduate enrollment 
The own-price elasticity  ^of nonresident undergraduate enrollment is -0.723 and is 
significant The magnitude of the own-price elastici^  is smaller than first-time nonresident 
freshmen enrollment This implies that nonresident students already attending ISU are less 
price sensitive than the freshmen. The implication of this result is discussed later in this 
section. 
Family income, per pupil expenditures on primary and secondary schooling, and college 
over high school salary all have positive effects on undergraduate nonresident enrollments. 
The size of the high school graduating class and the state subsidy for higher education have 
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negative effects but are not significant Distance has a negative and significant impact on 
nonresident undergraduate enrollment at Iowa State. While the number of alumni has a 
smaller effect on undergraduate nonresident enrollmoit than first-time fi«sfaman nonresident 
enrollment, the effect remains positive and significant 
Nonresident applications for admission 
The findings for plications ate similar to the previous regressions. Since the decision 
to apply does not involve paying nonresident tuition, but only the prospect of paying tuition 
if the individual is granted admission and accepts, one might expect a less elastic price 
response. The coefBcient on ISU nonresident tuition is negative and significant (-0.648), and 
it implies that applications ate less price elastic than ate fieshmen or undergraduate 
nonresident enrollment Two other fectors that are negatively related to nonresident 
applications to ISU are distance fix>m Ames and the ratio of college to high school salary. 
The coefficient of relative salary is not significant fiom zero. Family income has a positive 
and significant effect on the decision to apply, with an income elasticity of 1.435. The 
number of ISU alumni, high school graduates, expenditures on primary and secondary 
education, and home state subsidies for higher education have positive effects on nonresident 
applications for admission to ISU. 
The estimates in Table 2J2 ate generally consistent with economic theory. The various 
measures of demand for ISU yield elasticities that are consistent in sign and indicate more 
elastic responses for first-time nonresident enrollments than for plications or total 
undergraduate enrollments. College education is shown to be a normal good. ISU 
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enrollments and a l^ications are sensitive to price changes with own-price elasticities in the 
inelastic range. Finally, ISU nonresident enrollments increase with the number of alumni and 
decrease with distance. 
Simulations of nonresident enrollment 
While the sign and magnitude of the coefBcients indicate the direction and size of a 
response averaged over the sample period, simulations can illustrate the magnitude of the 
effect of a specific ^ tor for each period in the san l^e. Figure 2.5 shows the actual and 
predicted first time nonresident oitollment over the sample. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the 
Figure 2.5: Actual and Baseline nonresident first-time fireshmen enrollment, 1974-1993. 
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'igure 2.6: Baseline and simulated nonresident first-time freshmen enrollment, 1974-1993. 
Simulations hold a &ctor (returns to college (salary ratio), high school graduates, or per 
capita income) constant at the 1973 level. 
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'igure 2.7: Baseline and simulated nonresident first-time freshmen enrollment, 1974-1993. 
Simulation holds real ISU nonresident tuition constant at the 1973 level. 
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predicted eozoUmeiit level evaluated at the historical values of the regressors (labeled 
baseline). The figure also contains three simulated enrollment paths that hold college over 
high school salaries, then per capita income, and finally the number of high school graduates 
constant at their 1973 levels. Deviations of simulated first-time nonresident enrollments 
fix)m the baseline illustrate the in[q>act of changes in the variable on emnllments over time. 
Simulations show that 15 percent of the nonresident freshmen enrollment at Iowa State in 
1993 can be attributed to increases in per c i^ta &mily income over the last 21 years. 
Similarly, 5 percent of the enrollment in 1993 can be attributed to changes in the high school 
graduating class size. Finally, the increases in the salary ratio account for 28 percent of the 
increased nonresident first-time fieshmen enrollment at ISU in 1993. 
The University has some control over enrollments by setting the price (tuition) charged to 
nonresident students. More accurately, the Board of Regents sets the price with input 
fix)mofficials at ISU. Figure 2.7 simulates nonresident fireshmen enrollment at ISU holding 
real nonresident tuition constant at the 1973 level. Real tuition initially declined relative to 
the 1973 level so simulated enrollment is below the baseline enrollment until 1984. 
Thereafter, simulated nonresident enrollment rises above baseline when real nonresident 
tuition is held constant Over the period, an average of 70 more first-time nonresident 
students per year would have enrolled had real tuition remained constant Specifically, in 
1993 nonresident freshmen enrollment is 34 percent lower than if tuition had remained 
constant (in real dollars) at the 1973 level. Had family incomes not increased, the policy of 
increasing real tuition would have caused dramatic reductions in enrollments. Alternatively, 
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one can presume that the increase in real tuition allowed universities to absorb some of the 
rents of the increased returns to college. 
Policy implications of die nonresidoit enroilment anatysis 
The goals of revenue maximization and enrollment maximization cannot be achieved 
simultaneously.^  Revenue maximization suggests that tuition be increased, since the demand 
is inelastic. However, according to the law of demand, enrollment falls as tuition rises. The 
estimates of the own-price elastici^  fiom the models of first-time and undergraduate 
nom«sident enroUment are -0.971 and -0.723, respectively. In each case, the elasticity is in 
the inelastic range. This implies that revenues can be increased by increasing the price of 
attending ISU. The question that a "revenue maximizmg policy maker" would now ask is, 
"What percentage increase in nonresident tuition will maximize revenues?" 
Suppose that a proposed percentage change in ISU tuition is X. Let T be current tuition 
and current enrollment be E. The change in enrollment from a change in T is determined by 
the own-price elasticity of demand T), where < 0. Revenue from tuition R, is 
When X=0, R=TE or current tuition times current enrollment As X changes, tuition 
changes to (1+X)T and enrollment changes to E(I+tiX). Maximizing equation (2.9) with 
respect to X, 
R = (1 + X)T-E(1 + 7X). (2.9) 
g = TE(l+i,+2,X) = 0. (2.10) 
Finally, solving for X in (2.10), the optimum percentage change in tuition is 
 ^It is beyond the scope of diis paper to discuss die merit of mariTniTing revenue over other goals. 
i 
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X* 
2ti 
(2.11) 
In general, when T] =-1, X is zero. This would be the case under the unit elasticity  ^
assumption. If the price elasticity where inelastic, ii > -1, the optimal strategy is to raise 
tuition (X* > 0). Finally, if an elastic price response where found, r\ < -1, the optimal 
strategy is to lower tuition (X* < 0). 
It is worth noting again that statistical tests do not rgect that the price elasticity is equal 
to -I. Unit elasticity, (price elasticity equal to -1) is by definition the price that maximizes 
revenues. Thus, under the unit elasticity assumption a policy that holds real nonresident 
tuition constant at the cuirent level would be recommended as optimal. 
Predicted revenue and enrollment changes fix>m proposed changes in tuition are shown in 
Table 2.3. If officials are interested in maximizing nonresident tuition revenue th  ^should 
siipport an increase in nonresident tuition of 1.5 percent, when the nomesident first-time 
freshmen model is used. Since more senior students are less sensitive to changes in price, the 
Table 2.3; Tuition adjustments with predicted changes in enrollment and revenues (in 1994 
dollars). 
(Group) Initial Price Enrollment Revenue 
Elasticity A Price AEnrollment A Revenue 
% A Price % A Enrollment % A Revenue 
(Freshmen) $7,731 982 7.6 mill 
-0.971 +115 -14 +1,643 
+1.49% -1.47% +0.02% 
(Undergrad) $7,731 3,632 28.1 miU. 
-0.723 +1,481 -503 +744,976 
+19.16% -16.08% +2.65% 
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revenue maximizing tuition increase is 19 percent with the undergraduate enrollment model. 
However, the freshmen enrollment is the mote ^ >propriate esthnate since it will reflect the 
long term enrollment response to the tuition policy. The short tenn tuition revenue increase 
is estimated to be $744,976, but at the ocpense of503 fewer nonresident undergraduate 
students per year. The increased revenue from the freshmen class is only $1,643, with an 
estimated decline of 14 nonresident freshmen per year. After 4 years of reduced freshmen 
enrollments, assuming an annual drop-out rate of 15.7 percent, the added annual revenue 
from a 1.5 percent nonresident tuition increase relative to no increase would be just $5,182 
per year. 
These results indicate that nonresident tuition at ISU has approached the revenue 
maximizing level. Large increases in tuition, above the inflation rate, would lead to a decline 
in revenues for the universi^ . A price increase that does not cover inflation (or a real price 
decrease), would lead to larger enrollments, but a decline in revenues. It is important to keep 
in mind that any increase in price will lead to fewer students enrolling. 
To review, the results are similar across first-time nonresident student enrollment, 
undergraduate nonresident enrollment, and nonresident £q)plications for admission. The 
empirical results regarding the national trends in college enrollment indicate that: 
• ^creases in per capita income lead to increases in enrollment and the number of 
applicants. 
• Increased returns to education have increased nonresident freshmen enrollment, but the 
estimates are not precise. 
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• Declines in the number of high school graduates actually lead to increased college 
enrollment 
• Primary school expenditures have a positive effect on enrollment 
The results of those variables that enter the analysis in the choice of "which college to 
attend", conditional on choosing college in the first stage are; 
• The own-price elasticity of demand for nonresident enrollment is inelastic and a modest 
increase in tuition leads to modest increases in revenues but declines in enrollments. 
• Distance fiom Ames is negatively related to nonresident enrollment 
• The number of alunmi in a state is positively related to nonresident enrollment at ISU. 
• State subsidies for higher education have a negative effect on enrollment 
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CHAPTER3 
RESIDENT ENROLLMENT BY COUNTY, 1976 -1994 
fntrodactioii 
This section examines resident enrollment at Iowa State University by county. Resident 
students account for 74 percent of the new undergraduates and 77 percent of undergraduates 
at Iowa State University (Iowa State Universi^ , Enrollment Services Annual Stcaistical 
Report, 1995). The underlying economic theory presented earlier is consistent for both 
resident and nonresident enrollment. The factors that affect a student's decision to enroll in 
college are generally the same for an in-state, out-of-state, or piivate institution. i^roUment 
at an in-state public institution can be used to examine the factors that influence the decision 
to go to college and the decision of which college to attend. 
One important difference between enrolling in an in-state versus out-of-state institution is 
that in-state public tuition is much lower than out-of-state or private tuition. Typically, 
resident tuition is one third of the non-resident or private rates. Basic economic theory 
predicts that goods that are lower priced will be less responsive to price changes. The 
difference in price indicates that in-state students behave as "different economic agents" than 
students who enroll at out-of-state or private institutions. A second reason for «cpecting a 
lower price elasticity for resident enrollment is that goods with fewer substitutes will be less 
responsive to price than a good with several substitutes. Relative to nonresident enrollment, 
where there are 605 public and 1,610 4-year private schools, there are relatively few public 
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institutions in Iowa (i.e. the 3 Regents institutions, Iowa State University, the University of 
Northern Iowa, and the University of Iowa). Therefore, nonresident and resident enrollment 
are treated in separate models. 
This section examines three measures of the demand for education at Iowa State 
University; first-time resident enrollment, resident undergraduate enrollment, and the 
nimiber of resident plications for admission. The data for these models are available by 
county fix)m 1976 to 1994. 
The Iowa Case Reviewed 
The underlying demogr^hic and background information was discussed at length at the 
beginning of this chapter. The number of high school graduates in Iowa has decreased over 
30 percent since 1973. Because a large proportion of undergraduates enter ISU directly fiom 
high school, this would indicate a decline in the eligible population of new undergraduates. 
However, if the proportion of Iowa high school graduates going to college is increasing, as is 
the case nationally, then it is not necessary that enrollments fall. Resident students consider 
the increased income with a college degree in their decision to enroll at ISU. The ratio of 
college to high school salaries has been steadily increasing over the period. This would 
indicate an increase in the demand for enrollment at ISU. Unlike the national trend, per 
capita income in Iowa has increased only modestly since 1973. By 1994, Iowa real per c i^ta 
income was 7 percent above the 1973 level. Nevertheless, if resident enrollment at ISU is a 
noimal good, this increase would lead to an increase in enrollment 
Iowa State's closest competitors for resident students are the other two Regents 
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institutions and the Iowa community colleges. Tuition at all thiee Regents institutions is 
detennined by the Board of Regents. Over time, tuition has increased by the same proportion 
in the three institutions, so there is no way to isolate the effect of an ISU tuition increase 
without simultaneously experiencing an increase in tuition of its competing in-state 
universities. Hoenack (1971) and Hoenack and Weiler (1975) also noted this issue. 
Therefore, a measure of the price of a substitute university (other than tuition) is required. To 
account for the presence of the University of Iowa, distance to Iowa City is used as a cost of 
attending U of I. 
National average two-year tuition is used as the price at a substitute institution of higher 
education. The Des Moines Register (My 7,1997) reported that enrollment at Iowa two-
year colleges has increased 45 percent since 1986. t^he price of attending these two-year 
schools has increased slower than ISU tuition, students may be enrolling in the two-year 
institutions instead of ISU. Students attending a two-year college also have the option, with 
very little di£5culty, to transfer to a university. Thus, increases in community college 
enrollments may lead to declines in the number of freshmen attending ISU, but increases in 
the nimiber of undergraduates, as a result of increased transfer students. 
Econometric Model of Resident Enrollment by Coonty 
The econometric model below explains resident demand for Iowa State University as a 
function of prices, income, and population. The dependent variable is enrollment from 
county c and year t (Ec,t)- The specification used in this analysis is 
U 
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to(E„) = A + a,lii(Xf,)+a, ln(N„) +r< ta(P.'")+rjIii(Df) + 
(+) W M C-) (-) J. 
+Ato(Pr)+AIn(Df)+f,, 
V ' O) (+) 
The variables are described in Table 3.1. The analysis covers 99 counties and 19 years. 
Three dependent variables are used as measures of first-time student enrollment (1976 -
1994), resident undergraduate enrollment (1976-1983,1986-1994)  ^and the number of 
applications for admission (1976 - 1994) to Iowa State University. 
The factors that enter the decision to enroll in college or the labor force are current 
income, expected increased earnings fix)m college and the number of high school graduates. 
County per capita income is expected to increase enrollments, if higher education is a normal 
good, hicreases in the salary of college graduates relative to those without a college degree, 
should also increase demand for Iowa State. Roughly 75 percent of incoming fteshmen are 
recent high school graduates, so larger county high school graduating classes would be 
expected to increase the number of county residents enrolling at ISU the following fall. 
The price of attending ISU is real resident tuition in 1994 dollars, P,"". As the real price 
of attending ISU increases, enrollments ate expected to &I1 according to the law of demand. 
Therefore, the coefficient P2 is expected to have a negative sign. The other measure of the 
cost of attending ISU is distance fiom the county to Ames, Df. The expected sign P3, the 
coefficient on the distance to Ames, is also negative. 
The University of Iowa is the largest public university in Iowa and is ISU's single largest 
' The undergraduate enrollment data by county for 1984 and 1985 are not available. 
i 
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Table 3.1: Brief definitions of variables used in the analysis of resident enrollment by counQr. 
Variable Definition: (variables are by county and year, unless noted) 
Dependent Variable 
First-time Freshmen Iowa State University new &11 freshmen resident enrollment 
Undergraduate Enrollment Iowa State University total undergraduate resident enrollment 
Applications 
Independent Variables 
yC (yI®) 
N 
pisu 
Disu 
Iowa State University resident plications for admission 
real income per capita 
national median annual income of males with 4 yrs. of college 
(high school) as highest degree completed 
number of high school graduates 
real Iowa State University aimual resident tuition 
distance from Ames, Iowa to the county (in miles) 
real national average annual tuition and fees at public 2-year 
institutions 
distance from Iowa City, Iowa to the county (in miles) 
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competitor for Iowa high school graduates. lacreased distance from the University of Iowa is 
^ected to increase county  ^enrollment at ISU. Students that reside farther fiom Iowa City 
may be more likely to attend ISU both because of the lower moving costs and for presumed 
stronger tastes or loyalties to the closer state schooL  ^ Other competitors for resident students 
at ISU are the 25 public two-year colleges in Iowa. As tuition at two-yeais colleges increases 
enrollment at ISU is expected to increase. 
Resident Coimty Level Empirical Anatysis 
The variation of the logarithm of resident enrollment by county was first analyzed using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). As in the nonresident model, Durban-Watson tests on the 
OLS specification indicated the presence of autocorrelated errors. The Cochrane-Orcutt 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator ^ ILE) was used to goierate the estimates in this section. 
The coefficients of the regression remain interpretable as elasticities. 
First-time resident freshmen enrollment 
The MLE coefficients for first-time resident freshman enrollment at ISU are presented in 
Table 3 JZ. The results and implications are discussed below. The first three variables enter 
the analysis in the first decision, "go to college or enter the labor force". The coefBcient of 
per c i^ta county income is positive and significantly different fix)m zero. The income 
elasticity is 0.569, which indicates that the first year of college enrollment is a normal good 
and in the "necessity" range Gess than 1). A10 percent increase in real per capita county 
income would lead to a 5.7 percent increase in first-time resident enrollment at ISU. 
 ^Distance fit>m die county of residence to die Univetsity of Northern Iowa and die {iresence of a two-year 
college in die county or neighboring county were also exammed. These measures were not significant in 
expliuning enrollment or applications at Iowa State. 
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Table 3.2: MLE regression coefficients for full sample (99 Counties), 1976-1994 (log-log 
specification) 
Coefficient First-time Freshmen Undergrad. Enrollment .^ >plications 
Intercept -4.78 0.124»» -4.133*** 
(-5.84) (2.45) (-6.59) 
Income per c i^ta 0.569*** -0.062 0.642*** 
(5.53) (-1.60) (7.21) 
College over Ifigh 0.134 -0.128 0.709*** 
School Salary (0.47) (-0.85) (2.78) 
High school 0.937»»* -0.004 0.930*** 
graduates (55.03) (-0.14) (58.04) 
ISU nonresident -0.088 -0.069 -0.041 
tuition (-0.47) (-1.04) (-0.26) 
Distance to -0.489*»» -0.711 -0.425*** 
ISU (-22.59) (-1.29) (-20.65) 
2 yr public tuition 0.219 -0.197** 0.060 
(0.87) (-2.01) (0.28) 
Distance to 0.176»^* -0.374 0.161*** 
U of Iowa (1026) (-0.88) (9.85) 
n 1782 1485 1782 
Rr squared 0.8684 0.9831 0.9043 
MSE 0.090 0.012 0.068 
() t-ratios 
*** significant at 1 pocent 
significant at 5 percent 
* significant at 10 percent 
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Resident enrollment is less sensitive to business cycles than nonresident enrollment 
The college over high school salary ratio has a positive effect on resident enrollment but 
the coefficient is not significantly different fiom zero. First-time resident enrollment does 
not appear to have responded to the recent increase in returns to college. The coefficient on 
the number of high school graduates in a county is 0.937. The impact of a 10 percent 
increase in high school graduates is predicted to be 9.4 percent Statistical tests £ul to rgect 
that this coefficient is different fiom 1. This would indicate that first-time resident 
enrollment changes in direct proportion to the number of high school graduates in Iowa. 
The own-price elasticity of first-time resident enrollment at ISU is -0.088. This is in the 
inelastic range and the coefficient is not significantly different fiom zero. The model predicts 
that a 10 percent increase in resident tuition would lead to an enrollment decline of less than 
I percent so that aggregate tuition revenues would increase substantially. This small price 
elasticity may be misleading in that every price increase at ISU is accompanied by a similar 
increase at the University of Iowa and UNI. Therefore, this elasticity represents the net effect 
of a price increase at all three Regents schools. Hoenack (1971) and Hoenack and Weiler 
(1975) reach a similar conclusion in their study of enrollment at UCXA and the University of 
Minnesota, respectively. If ISU tuition were to increase while fees at U of I and UNI 
remained constant, the implied reduction in enrollment at ISU presumably would be 
significantly larger. 
The distance from Ames has a negative and significant effect on ISU first-time 
enrollments. Counties that are farther from Iowa State tend to have smaller enrollments, all 
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else equal. Similarly, counties that are fother &om the University of Iowa tend to have 
larger freshmen enrollment at Iowa State. The distance results are consistent with the price 
results. A10 percent increase in distance to both Iowa State and Iowa leaves ISU enrollment 
lower. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in tuition at ISU and U of I tuition would leave Iowa 
State's enrollment lower. Since tuition at Iowa State UniversiQr and the University of Iowa 
are virtually identical, distance from home represents one way that the cost of enrollment 
differs between the two schools. The distance results suggest a policy of offering larger 
tuition scholarship to resident ^ licants as distance to ISU increases and as distance to U of I 
falls. 
The national average two-year public college tuition positively affects ISU first-time 
resident enrollment, however, the coefScient is not significantly different from zero. While 
the coefBcient is imprecise, a 10 percent increase in the price of two-year colleges leads to a 
predicted increase in first-time resident freshmen of only 2 percent 
Resident ondergradaate enrollment and applications for admission to ISU 
To test the robustness of the previous results, undergraduate enrollment and applications 
for admission by county are regressed on the same set of explanatory variables. 
Undergraduate enrollment appears to behave differently than first-time resident enroUment 
The model for plications for admissions is very similar to first-time resident enroUment 
The signs and significance levels of first-time resident enrollment and plications are 
identical. The model of undergraduate enrollment has some sign changes, relative to the 
first-time student enrollment 
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Resident ondergnidnate enrollment by county 
Manski and Wise (1983) piesoit a model of college enrollment that treats the decision to 
continue in college as a separate decision finm the decision to initially enroll. Undergraduate 
enrollment implicitly includes the issue of persistence. Students may came to a university 
and find that college is not for them. This is pedu^s one explanation for the findings that 
only two of the coefBdents have the same sign in the undergraduate enrollment model, 
relative to the first-time fi«shmen model. It may also explain why only one coefficient is 
statistically significant from zero. 
ISU resident tuition remains negative and insignificant Recall that this small coefficient 
may be a direct result of the tuition at all Regents institutions moving together. The 
coefficient of two-year college tuition changes sign and is significant The difference is due 
to the possibility of transferring into ISU after attending two years at one of the community 
colleges in the state.^  In 1995,31 percent of the new students at ISU were transfer students, 
and of these transfer students, 46 percent came from an Iowa area commimity college (ISU 
Annual Statistical Report, 1995). If the process of transferring finm a community college to 
ISU is relatively simple, students may choose to attend the community college for 2 years 
because of the lower price, with the intention of transferring to ISU. This would make 
undergraduate enrollment at ISU and 2-year schools complementary goods. Thus, as the 
price of attending a community college increases, enrollment at the 2-year school will 
decrease. Therefore, the number of transfer students will decline resulting in smaller 
 ^Chrcssanthis (1986) found die own-price response for juniors was positive. He attributed this to the large 
number of two-year transfer students into SVSC. 
J 
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undergraduate enrollment at Iowa State. However, recall that 2-year school enrollment us a 
substitute for first-time student enrollment at ISU, with a positive cross price elasticity  ^of 
0.22. However, the substitution effect of freshmen emollment does not outweigh the upper-
class effect of 2-year tuition. 
The effect of distance to ISU is negative, but not significantly different from zero. The 
coefficient of distance to Iowa City changes sign from the previous regression, but becomes 
insignificant The insignificance of the two distance coefScients may result from the 
increased cost of transferring out of the university. Once a student has invested a year at ISU, 
the cost of leaving for another college becomes more expensive. Therefore, the cost of 
attending ISU, proxied by the distance to the University of Iowa and ISU becomes less 
important 
Family income, returns to college, and the number of high school graduates enter the 
analysis in the first stage decision between college and the labor force. The coefScients of 
Oiese three variables are negative but not significantly different fiom zero. The lack of 
significance indicates that, while these variables do explain the initial decision to enroll, they 
do not explain the decision to continue in college. These results indicate that further study on 
the issue of retention may be necessary to detennine what ^ tors are important in explaining 
undergraduate enrollment 
Resident applications for admission to ISU by coonty  ^
The theoretical model predicts that the application results should be similar to first-time 
resident enrollment These expectations are confirmed. Signs on coefGdents are identical in 
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the two regressions. The income and price elasticities are similar in magnitude in the two 
models. 
A10 percent increase in county per capita income leads to a 6.4 percent increase in the 
number of ^ )plications. Resident plications for admission are not strongly influenced by 
ISU tuition. Consistent with economic theory, the price elasticity is smaller for applications 
than for enrollment, altiiough both estimates are mqirecise. 
The coefficients of the two measures of distance are significant and have the expected 
signs, negative for distance to ISU and positive for distance to Iowa City. All else equal, a 
county that is farther from Iowa City will have more applications for admission to Iowa 
State. Similarly, counties closer to Ames will have more £q>plicants. The national average 
two-year tuition coefScient is positive, but again not significant The number of high school 
graduates and the ratio of college to hi^  school salaries have strong positive effects on 
applications for admission to ISU. The ratio of salaries is significant for plications. This 
indicates that the relative returns from college pear to be generating interest in college, but 
tha  ^Iowa State has not converted this increased interest (i.e. increased plications) into 
increased enrollment 
Simulations of resident first-time enrollment 
Resident enrollment has remained relatively stable over the 19 years. Resident 
enrollment in 1977 was 4,449. It peaked in 1979 at 4,934. Since 1979, first-time resident 
enrollment decreased to 3,517 in 1994. The model predicts an enrollment path that is veiy 
similar to the actual path shown in Figure 3.1. Four simulated emxiUment paths are presented 
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for first-time resident enrollment. Figures 32 and 3.3 show the predicted enrollment level at 
historical values of the regressors (baseline). The simulations in Figure 32 show implied 
first-time resident enrollment time paths were the number of high school graduates, per capita 
income, or the ratio of college to high school salaries held fixed at their 1976 level. 
Differences between the simulated and actual paths illustrate the impact of Ae f^ors on 
enrollment 
The simulations show that the ratio of college to high school salaries had a small impact 
on the resident enrollments at Iowa State. If the salary ratio had not increased since 1976, 
resident enrollment at ISU would be 2.5 percent lower in 1994. The model also indicates that 
the 20 percent increase in Iowa per c i^ta income since 1976 accounts for a 6.5 percent 
increase in first-time resident enrollment in 1994. 
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Figure 3.1 Actual and baseline first-time resident enrolhnent, 1977 -1994. 
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Figure 3.2 Baseline and simulated first-time resident enzoUment, 1977 - 1994. Simulations 
hold a factor (college over high school salaries (returns), the number of hi^  school 
graduates, or per c i^ta income) constant at the 1976 level. 
1.15 
o 
o 
l.I .. 
1.05 .. 
1  . .  
•S 0-95 a 
e 
0.9 
0.85 .. 
0.8 
-O—B*selme | 
.g ISUTuitioii 
1976 1980 
1977: EaroDinent" 4,406 
1984 1988 
Year 
1992 1996 
Figure 3.3 Baseline and simulated first-time resident enrollment, 1977 -1994. Simulation 
holds real ISU resident tuition constant at the 1976 level. 
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The 20 percent decline in the number of high school graduates since 1976 is responsible 
for an estimated reduction of806 resident students by 1994. The simulated enrollment path 
when real resident tuition at ISU is held fixed at the 1976 level figure 33) also shows a very 
small effect, implying that increases in real resident tuition since 1976 reduced resident 
enrollment by 1.8 percent However, since tuition levels at the Regents institutions are set by 
the Regents and tend to move together, the predicted path of enrollment reflects tiie impact of 
enrollment at Iowa State University as tuition at all Regents institutions remained constant at 
the 1976 level. 
Policy Implications of Resident Enrollment 
The finding of an inelastic price response to resident tuition suggests that if the university 
wants to maximize tuition revenue, it should raise the price that resident students are charged. 
While the estimate of the own-price elasticity of demand is very imprecise, the 99 percent 
confidence region for the coefficient is (-0.565,0.389), clearly in the inelastic range. 
However, the strong correlation between tuition at the Regents institutions clouds this 
measure of the own-price elasticity of demand for Iowa State University. Because of the 
strong correlation in the prices, this effect captures the impact on enroUment when all 3 
Regents institutions increase tuition by 1 percent, not ISU in isolation. The effect of prices 
captured by the two distance measures indicate that ISU and U of I are substitutes. Thus a 
the price to attend the U of I increases, enrollment at ISU would be expected to increase. 
There are reasons to maintain low resident tuition that are unrelated to the goal of 
maximizing revenue. However, the results suggest that tuition revenues would increase by 
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increasing resident tuition. The remaining factors behave as expected. Iowa high school 
graduating class sizes play a very strong role in detennining first-time resident airollment at 
Iowa State. Enrollments change in rough proportion to changes in high school class sizes. 
Coefficients on the two distance measures indicate that recruiting efforts might be more 
productive in areas closer to Ames, and farther fix>m Iowa City. Targeting the central and 
western sections of the state may be relatively more productive. Alternatively, larger 
scholarship inducements may be necessary to increase emnllments from eastern Iowa. 
In summary, the models of first-time fi«shmen resident enrollment and q)plications for 
admission find that 
• Resident enrollment and plications are almost unresponsive to changes in tuition. 
• First-time resident enrollment is positively related to changes in the tuition at two-year 
colleges, but the effect is very small. 
• Increases in Iowa per c i^ta income lead to increased resident enrollment 
• Distance fixim Ames negatively influences first-time resident enrollment at ISU, while 
distance finm the University of Iowa is positively related to enrollment at Iowa State. 
• Resident plications for admission are very responsive to increased relative college 
salaries, but first-time resident enrollment is not strongly driven by the increased salary 
ratio. 
Comparing Resident and Nonresident Results 
The two empirical models presented here examined enrollment at Iowa State University. 
The impacts of the changes in the incentives to attend college in general were separated fix>m 
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the changes in the incentives to attend Iowa State University. Within each classification of 
resident and nonresident, first-time freshmen enrollment, imdergraduate enrollment and 
applications for admission yielded similar results. The one ocception is resident 
undergraduate enrollment 
The results show that first-time resident enrollment is relatively unresponsive to increases 
in tuition (own-price elasticity of demand or -0.088), while first-time nonresident enrollment 
will respond to an increase in tuition with an equal decrease (in percentage tenns) in 
enrollment (own-price elasticity of demand = -0.971). Increases in nonresident tuition will 
not lead to increases in revenue, but will cause declines in enrollment Increases in resident 
tuition will lead to modest declines in enrollment, but relatively large increases in revenue. 
The policy, if the goal is to maximize tuition revenue, is to increase resident tuition above the 
inflation rate and increase nonresident tuition only to cover inflation. 
Resident first-time freshmen enrollment is less responsive to increases in income than are 
nonresident enrollments. The income elasticities for resident and nonresident first-time 
student enrollment are 0.569 and 1.6S5, respectively. A policy that increased the per capita 
income (such as the recently passed "Hope Scholarship" (tax credit)) would lead to larger 
percentage increases in nonresident enrollment than resident enrollment 
This chapter presented a two-stage model of the decision to invest in higher education. 
The model captures the changes in incentives to invest in higher education generally and the 
changes in the incentives to invest in a particular institution. The econometric results are 
consistent with previous research and the underlying intuition of the demand for higher 
74 
education. The empirical results also attribute the large increase in enrollment in higher 
education nationally to increased fionily mcome and increased expected returns to higher 
education. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE INDIVIDUAL'S DECISION TO ENROLL AND THE PRICE 
DISCRIMINATING INSTITUTION 
Introdacdon 
The college choice decision is a complex process. la 1994, there were 3,688 institutions 
of higher education in the United States alone. James et al. (1989) studied a school's 
importance in ocplaining earnings of college graduates. Th  ^found that the proportion of 
earnings attributable to the college attended was small. Choice of major, courses studied, and 
grades received explained a larger share of the wage variation across individuals. 
... while sending your child to Harvard appears to be a good investment, sending him to 
your local state university  ^to major in Engineering, to take lots of math, and preferably to 
attain a high GPA, is an even better private investmoit Apparently, what matters most is 
not which college you attend but what you do while you are there, (p. 251 - 2) 
If private and public degrees yield comparable earnings after college, college choice is 
likely to depend heavily on the relative cost of attending college. If the desired major and 
courses are available at similar institutions, the student may choose the school with the 
lowest net price of attending. On the other hand, the college needs to understand the efifect of 
their policies on the individual's decision to enroll. The administration should be able to 
evaluate which prospective students are likely to enroll, and what the effect of financial aid 
would be on the probability of enrolling. 
This chi^ ter examines an individuals' decision to enroll at Iowa State University. The 
model examines first-year fi%shmen admitted s l^icants. Four empirical tests are discussed 
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in this chq>ter. The first test deals with the individual's response to changes in price, income 
and other Actors. The elasticities of demand and income axe discussed in this section. N»ct, 
the empirical results determine the cost of targeting specific &ctots, (such as increasing the 
ACT or class rank) m terms of the tradeoff in tuition. Third, the results can test if the 
university is effectively price discriminating. Finally, the model is used to map the expected 
eiirollment demand curve for the institution. The model predicts reservation prices for each 
individual, given a target probability  ^of enrollment Once the reservation price and target 
probability of enrollment are known, the expected enrollment demand curve and expected 
revenue can be determined. Furthemore, various tuition policies are examined to determine 
the response of enrollment and revenues under each policy. 
Overview of Data 
The data used in this analysis was obtained through die Office of Financial Aid and the 
Office of Student Af&irs. Admissions q)plications, financial aid £q)plications, and financial 
aid awards are merged with the aggregate data used in the previous chs t^er. This section 
reviews the demogr^hic trends of enrollment and admission applicants at ISU from 1976 to 
1994. 
A brief overview of the qiplicant pool may be helpfiil. The average age of an ^ licant is 
18.3 years old. Females make up 45 percent of resident ^ licants and 42 percent of 
nonresidents. Ethnic minorities account for 3 percent of resident applicants and 18 percent of 
nonresidents. Fourteen percent of resident applicants and 5 percent of nonresidents are 
children of ISU alumni- The average applicant has a class rank in the top quarter and an ACT 
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score of 24.5, which, is 4 points above the national average/ Of the financial aid qyplicants, 
average parental income is $27,472 in 1994 dollars. 
The time paths of the number of admitted resident and nonresident students are shown in 
Figure 4.L The number of nonresidents admitted to ISU nq)idly increased in the early 1980s. 
The nonresident applicant pool peaked in 1983 at 3,480. The number of nonresidents 
admitted to ISU declined for the next 8 years to 2,228 students in 1991. hi the last 4 years 
the number of ^ licants has increased and in 1994 was back at the 1983 level. 
The resident s^plicant pool has remained relatively constant over the period. In 1976 
4,144 students from Iowa were admitted to Iowa State University. The number of admitted 
applicants remained above the 1976 level until 1990. In 1991, the number of admitted 
resident q)plicants fell to 3,504. In 1994,3,835 residoit ^ licants were admitted, which is 8 
p^ent below the 1976 level. 
Figure 4.2 shows the enrollment rates of residents and nonresidents over the period. 
There is a downward trend in both time paths. A downward trend in the enrollment rate can 
be caused by a relative increase in q)plications or a relative decline in the number of students 
enrolling. The nonresident enrollment rate is 30 to 40 percent below the resident rate. This 
is due, in part, to the higher tuition that the nonresident students would be required to pay if 
they enrolled at ISU. Nonresident enrollment rates have declined from 47 percent to 21 
percent. Recall that Figure 2.4 shows that the 1994 nonresident enrollment at ISU was 
slightly above the 1976 level. It is clear that the declining enrollment rate of nonresidents is 
' The 1995 nauonal average ACT score was 20.8 according to an ACT internet press release dated 8/13/97. 
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Figure 4.1; Number of students admitted to Iowa State University, 1976 - 1996, relative to 
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Figure 4.2; Enrollment rate of resident and nonresident students at ISU, 1976 - 1995. 
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due to increased applications and not decreased enrollment. This has significant implications 
for tuition revenues, since the number of people paying tuition did not decline. 
However, the decline in the resident enrollment rate ^ ipears to be caused by a decrease in 
the number of students enrolling, since the number of plications has remained relatively 
stable. The resident enrollment rate dropped fix>m 76 to 61 percent over the past 20 years. 
Figure 2.4 confirms that 1994 resident enrollment is below the 1976 level. Thus, there are 
fewer resident students paying tuition. 
Universities are not only concerned with the number of people enrolling, but also the 
composition of students on campus. Savoca (1990) noted that the presence of afOmiative 
action programs may increase the probability of minorities and females being admitted. 
These groups are traditionally under-represented on canq)us and many colleges compete for 
them. Universities also target those students ^ o have high academic ability with several 
scholarship programs. Figures 4.3 to 4.8 show the composition of the plicant pool at ISU. 
The time paths of female s l^icants are very similar to the overall paths figure 4.3). The 
number of nonresident females admitted to ISU has grown significantly, fiom 851 in 1991 to 
1,586 in 1995. Figure 4.4 shows the enrollment rates of admitted resident and nonresident 
females. The enrollment rate of nonresident females dropped finm 50 percent to a low of 20 
percent in 1993. Female enrollment rates are slightly below the overall enrollment rate. 
However, the difference is at most 3 percent 
The time path of the number of admitted minority ^ licants is shown in Figure 4.5.^  
 ^Student records contaming infonnatioii on edmic background became available in 1983. 
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'igure 4.4: Female enrollment rates at Iowa State University, by resident status, 1976 - 1995. 
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Minority  ^applicants come disproportioiiately from outside of Iowa. There were 570 
nooresident minority students admitted in 1976 and only 145 resident minority students. 
This reflects the small percentage of ethnic minorities that live in lowa.^  In &ct, there are 
several years in which the nimiber of minorities enrolling from out-of-state exceeds the 
number (qfplying from Iowa. The eoroUment rates of minorities (shown in Figure 4.6) do not 
exhibit the steady decline found in the overall and female samples. The enrollment rate of 
minority ^ licants is 3 to 12 percent below the rate for all ^ licants. 
Student acadmic abilities influence the decision of which institution to attend. High 
ability students will be admitted to more prestigious institutions and may also qualify for 
merit based scholarships which raise their incentives to enroll in higher priced institutions. 
Rothschild and White (1995) discussed the octemalities associated with certain groiq)s of 
students. Grossman (1995) indicated that colleges target hi^  (academic, athletic, or artistic) 
ability students because faculty prefer to teach them and these students establish a reputation 
effect for the school. "This effect pleases alumni, who are the maiTi bene t^ors of private 
colleges, and also makes a college more attractive to other prospective students." (Grossman, 
1995 p. 519.) 
The fourth student group in this discussion are the qtplicants who graduated in the top 5 
percent of their high school class. The trends forhi^  ability  ^applicant are shown in Figures 
4.7and 4.8. Rank is a measure ofthe academic ability of prospective students. Thenumber 
of nonresident high ability applicants has a similar trend to the other nonresident s l^icants. 
 ^ In 1992, ethnic mmorities made up 33 percent and 19.8 percent of die population in Iowa and the U.S., 
respectively (IT.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996). 
i 
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Figure 4.5: The number of minority studoits admitted to ISU, by residency 1983 - 1995, 
relative to 1983. 
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Similarly, resident high ability applicants are relatively stable over the period. The 
enrollment rates of high ability applicants also show a downward trend, hi 1976, the 
enrollmoit rate of resident high ability  ^^ licants was 3 percent higher than the overall rate. 
Since 1982 the enrollment rate of resident high ability ^ licants has been below the average 
rate. The enrollment rate of high ability resident applicants was 8 percent below the averse 
in 1994. 
The student's college choice may also be influenced by his parents' college history. The 
alumni parents may "lobby" the prospective student to attend their alma mater. There are 
also university programs that recruit college-age (or younger) children of alumni For 
example, in the early 1990s, ISU started the '^ Legacy Program". When an alumnus has a 
child, the "Legacy Program" sends a childrra's story book and information about the 
importance of higher education to the &mily. 
Infomiation on &mily financial status is available in the financial aid iq)plication. 
Parents adjusted gross income is used in the current model. In reviewing the data, it was 
found that prior to 1985 and in 1990 and 1991, the data were incomplete. Only those 
students who enrolled were included in the data. Therefore, the enrollment rate of financial 
aid £q)plicants with retained records was 1. This would create a serious bias problem and so 
these years were not used in the analysis. 
The percent of admitted applicants that q)plied for financial aid is shown in Figure 4.9. 
The years used in the analysis (shown with bold lines) indicate that over 70 percent of the 
admitted resident students and 30 percent of the nonresident students £ l^ied for financial 
J 
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aid. 
The average fimily income (patents tepoited adjusted gross income) of financial aid 
l^icants is shown in Figure 4.10. Both resident and nonresident income has increased 
significantly. There are two fiictors that explain this increase. First, there was a general 
increase in per c i^ta income over the past 20 years, as shown in Figure 22. However, 
average parental income of financial aid ^ licants doubled since 1985. National and Iowa 
per capita income increased only 16 and 18 percent, respectively, over the same period. An 
additional reason for die increase in the average parental income may be that more families 
with larger incomes are s l^ying for financial aid 
Finally, an important tool for recruiting students is the financial aid offer. The 
prospective student will consider the financial aid award at each school, along with the other 
factors important in the college choice. Students are offered combinations of grants, loans 
and work-study opportunities in their financial aid packages. If the student qualifies for 
federal grant or loan aid at one school, it is likely that the student will also qualify for similar 
federal aid at other institutions. A grant reduces the cost of attending college dollar for 
dollar. However, loan aid only reduces the current out-of-pocket expense of attendance. The 
student will treat the various types of financial aid differently. The federal loan programs 
open (or provide easy access to) financial markets to low and middle income students who 
otherwise might not have the financial ability to pay for a college educatioiL Moore et al. 
(1991) foimd that of the three types of financial aid, grants had the largest effect on the 
probability of enrolling. 
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Data on the financial aid award are available from 1976 to 1994. The records include the 
final package, which may be different from the mtial offer. This is especially true of loan 
and work-study aid, where the student may decline all or part of her eligibility. The other 
problem is that only grant offers to students who emolled at ISU were kept Thus, according 
to the data, a student who did not enroll was not offered a financial aid package. Since 
financial aid offers are made well in advance of the emoUment decision, this problem must 
be addressed. The predicted grant award for those students who applied for financial aid was 
used.'^  The average actual and predicted grant aid are shown Figures 4.11 and 4.12, for 
resident and nonresident financial aid ^ licants, respectively. In both cases the predicted 
grant mimics the actual annual variation closely. 
The decision to enroll at a particular school depends on several Actors, from the 
academic ability of the student to the increased income as a result of the college degree. The 
next section develops a model that can determine how these factors affect the probability of 
enrolling at Iowa State University. 
Modeling the Individnal*s College Choice Decision 
In this section, an economic model describing an individual's college choice decision is 
discussed. Specifically, the individual is deciding which institution of higher education to 
make his or her human capital investment The student chooses among those schools to 
which th  ^have applied and been granted admission. 
The college choice decision has been modeled as a sequential process by Manski & Wise 
* The details of the predicted giant model are found in Appendix B. 
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(1983), where the students' decisions are: first, which colleges to qiply for admission; 
second, given admission and financial aid, which college to attend; and finally, whether to 
remain in college through graduation. This pq)er examines the second stage of the 
individual's decision, using data fix>m a single university. 
The reservation price of attending a college: A theoretical model 
The individual compares the available colleges and chooses to attend the one that 
maximizes utility. The decision to enroll depends on the characteristics of the individual, the 
characteristics of alternative institutions of higher education, and the current economic 
situation. In general, any factor that increases a student's range of college options will make 
the student more sensitive to the price of any one option. 
The cost of attending the school of interest, the cost of other schools, the returns to higher 
education and the quality and reputation of each school are &ctors that enter the college 
choice. The time paths of these variables were reviewed in Ch t^ers 1 and 2. 
The economic model used in this analysis considers individual i's indirect utility of 
attending college I. The utility is a fimction of the tuition, the financial aid package, the 
individual's characteristics, the characteristics of the institution, and a random error term. 
where 
T  ^ = tuition at school I 
S| = student i's scholarship package offered by school I 
X; = a vector of student i's characteristics 
i! 
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= a vector of characteristics of school I 
sf - stochastic portion ofstudenti's utility fiom school I (random error). 
The individual's college choice will depoid on the net cost of attending each college to 
which th  ^have been admitted. For ocample, suppose an individual is considering two 
colleges of equal quality and reputation. Since all else is equal, he will attend the institution 
with the lower net cost. Considering the perspective of the institution, to ensure that the 
individual will enroll, the institution must offer a scholarship that decreases net cost just 
below the cost of the other institution. 
This same thought experiment can be ^ lied to schools of unequal quality or reputation. 
If the institution perceived to be of lesser quality can offer a net cost of attending sufSciently 
below the higher quality institution, the individual may choose to attend the lesser quality 
school. 
In the spirit of the reservation wage models used in the study of labor force participation, 
the "reservation scholarship" can be defined as the level of scholarship that makes the 
individual indifferent between enrolling at one college over another, taking into account the 
differences between the schools. Standard assumptions on the indirect utility function 
guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a "reservation scholarship", S[ , such that 
E[U(T',Sr,Xj,Z')+«i']= E[U(T^S^,XJ,Z^) + f/]. (4.2) 
By the implicit function theorem 
sr=g(X!.' E' S\,X„Z\Z\el,sl). 
w (-) (4.3) 
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A linear approximation of the detemiimstic portion of (4.3) gives the predicted reservation 
scholarship. 
where P4, ^5, represent vectors of coefiScients. 
The decision to enroll in college I can be characterized as a function of the predicted 
reservation scholarship and the actual scholarship offered. The individual attends college I 
according to the following rule: 
^dividual i's probability of enrolling in school I can be written as a function of the tuition 
and financial aid package of each school, the characteristics of the two institutions, and the 
characteristics of the individual. 
Econometric model 
The econometric specification is a linear ^ roximation of equation (4.6), the probability 
of enrolling at I. It also assumes the error terms are identically and independently distributed 
(i.i.d.) normal random variables. Making the appropriate transformation to obtain unit 
variance, equation (4.6) leads to a probit spedficatioiL hnplicit in the i.i.d. assumption of the 
probit model is that the enrollment decision of one individual is independent of other 
decisions to enroll. 
The two sources of data allow two separate econometric models to explain the decision to 
sr = A +X..A (4.4) 
enroll| (4.5) 
Pr(enroU| = 1) = F( ,^ T ,^ T/, X,-. Z  ^Z'). (4.6) 
(+) (-) (+) (-) 
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enroll at Iowa State. The first model will examine the decision to enroll based on the data 
firom the admission plication. The second model will examine the decision to enroll at ISU 
with the additional data contained in the &iancial aid plication. The two econometric 
models used in the analysis are described below. Table 4.1 gives a brief description of the 
variables used in the analysis, detailed infomiation is available in .^ )pendix B. 
Admisa'gns model: 
enroll! = + >9,T' + + y j^CoLiC; + / HS + ^ Rank,- + y^gACX. 
r r 
>9,PAlumi + i^oFeniale{ +^„Minotityj +y5^Dist[ +^„Distf + i^4CChoicej 
Finangial aidmodgl: 
enroU? =^o +AT' +AS[ +AT' +AS' +APAGIi +yff5Col/HS+ARank.. 
+ ^ gACTj + ^ gPAlumj + ('••S) 
+ i^jDistj + yff^Dist/ + /J^CChoice; + 
The probit model converts the observed discrete choice of enrolling at ISU into a 
continuous probability of enrolling at ISU. The estimated model can be used to examine the 
behavior of the prospective student as well as the behavior of the institution. 
Empirical test #1: The behavior of the prospective student 
The tests of student behavior deal with estimates of the coefficients. The own-price 
elasticity  ^of demand and income elasticity can be determined. This will give insight into the 
responsiveness in the probability of enrolling to changes in tuition, income, or subsidies 
(such as the proposed '*Hope Scholarship/tax credit" for college tuition). Furthermore, for 
the financial aid model, the elasticity of grant aid can be determined. This is the change in 
the probability of enrolling from a 1 percent change in the scholarship ofTer. 
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Table 4.1: Brief descriptioii of variables used in the econometric analysis. 
Variable: Sign Description 
Dependent Variable 
enroll^  dummy variable = 1 if admitted student enrolls at ISU, == 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables 
T  ^ - ISU tuition (resident or nonresident) 
+ predicted financial aid grants offered by Iowa State University 
T' + DMACC tuition(resident) 
own-state public 4-yr. Tuition (nonresident) 
- local subsidy of higher education 
Coinc + county per capita income (application model) or 
parents adjusted gross income (financial aid model) 
Rank ? High School Class Rank 
ACT ? ACT composite test score 
PAlum + dummy variable = I if parents are ISU alumni, == 0 otherwise 
Female ? dummy variable = 1 if female, = 0 otherwise 
Minority ? dummy variable -1 if minority, = 0 otherwise 
Dist - distance to Ames, lA (resident and nonresident) in miles 
+ distance to Iowa City, lA (resident) in miles 
CChoice - reports students ranking of which schools th  ^want the ACT scores 
sent (range [1,7], where 7 least favorable response). 
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Specifically, the hypothesis that the inq)act of a dollar increase in tuition can be of&et by 
a dollar increase in grant aid is tested. 
Ho'A =-A 
°  ^. (4.9) 
If this is the case the institution can maintain revenues by charging 1 more dollar in tuition 
and offering an additional dollar in scholarships. However, if the effect of a dollar increase 
in tuition is larger than the effect of a dollar increase in scholarships, then maintaining the 
number of students while tuition increases will require that scholarships be increased by a 
larger percentage than the tuition increase. 
The behavior of the miiversity 
The empirical model above provides the foimdation to examine the behavior of the 
institution. The university awards various financial aid packages to different groups, based 
on specific characteristics of individuals in the groiq> (i.e. high ability, residency status, 
financial need/ability to pay). The choice variable for the institution is S|,, the financial aid 
offer. The financial aid offer is packaged by group, as well as by individuals within a group. 
For example, the university might try to attract high ability nonresident students by offering a 
scholarship to all nonresident students that graduated in the top 5 percent of their high school 
class, or had an ACT test score in the top S percent. In addition, these students may also 
qualify for grants and loans that are conditional on their &nily financial status (i.e. federally 
calculated student need ind«c or family contribution), such as the Pell grant or Stafford loan. 
Thus, a financial aid package varies by individual and group. 
The financial aid packages can be used to achieve the emollment or revenue goals of the 
i\ 
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institution. One goal might be to achieve a targeted level of enrollment or enrollment mix. 
Another feasible goal is to maximize net revenue fiom students. The following provides a 
method to infer the goal of the university based on the enq)iiical estimates. 
Empirical Test 1t2: The cost of targeting specific diaracteristics 
Since enrollment is sensitive to tuition and scholarships, changing the avers^e 
characteristics of the qiplicants can be achieved by a change in tuition or financial aid, while 
holding the probability of enrolling constant For example, how much does tuition have to 
decrease to increase a characteristic x, (e.g. ACT, rank, male to female, etc.) by 1 unit, 
holding the probability of enrolling fixed? Denote the of&etting adjustment to the tuition as t 
and the initial tuition as T. 
FG9o+A(T + t)+ ,^(x + l) + XB) = F(^o+AT+Ax + XB) (4.10) 
Since F() is monotonic, 
^0 + A (T +1) +yff,(x +1) + XB = >^0 + AT + AxX + XB. (4.11) 
Subtracting the right hand side firom the left, 
At+Ax=0. (4.12) 
Finally, the required tuition tradeoff is. 
A 
(4.13) 
The same results hold if the policy variable were scholarships instead of tuition. These 
tradeofiEs are discussed for each variable used in the analysis. Since separate models are 
estimated for residents and nonresidents, the tradeoff are allowed to vary across residency 
status. 
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Empirical Test #3: Price discriminatioii and switching revenaes 
The university can use groi^  specific financial aid policies to achieve their enrollment 
goals. Charging different groiqis diffoent prices for the same product is called price 
discrimination. The group that has a less elastic demand curve would be charged a higher 
price (Scherer and Ross 1990, Varian 1989, Tirole 1989). In this case, the groiq> that has 
more options available would presumably have a la^er elasticity, all else equal. These 
groups would be charged a lower net price of attending. In theory, the revalue maYiTniTiTig 
university would set the price for each gcoiqi so as to equalize the marginal revenue of each 
group.^  On the other hand, if the marginal revenues are not equal, the university is not 
maximizing revenues by price discriminating. 
It is important that the university understand the revenue implications of awarding 
additional dollars of scholarship funds. If the marginal revenue of a scholarship is positive, 
revenues increase as aid increases. As noted in the literature, students with specific 
characteristics may be more desirable to the university (Savoca 1990, Manski and Wise 
1983). Thus, this analysis uses groiq)s of students with specific targeted characteristics. The 
pool of ^ >plicants is divided into mutually exclusive pairs based on academic ability, 
residency, ethnic background, or gender. The expected net revenue ^ NR) from group 1 is 
the product of the group size, net tuition per student, and the probabiUty of a member in the 
group enrolling. 
 ^Revenue maxmuzation is equivalent to profit maxnnization when die margin cost is equal to zero, which is 
assumed hete. Marginal cost is also assumed to be constant (and equal to zero) across groups. The zero 
marginal cost assunqition means diat add  ^die last student in cost free, which may be a good approximation 
of the marginal cost until capacity is reached. 
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ENRi =N,(T-St)F(^2S,) (4.14) 
where 
Ni = number of admitted ^ licants in group 1 (N  ^> 0) 
A 
probability of group 1 enrolling (i.e. the reduced form of (4.6)) 
where F(-) is a cumulative distribution fimction (CDF), f(-) is the 
A 
corresponding probability  ^density fimction (pdf), and is the coefficient 
on grant aid. 
T - Si = net tuition revenue per person in group l/ 
The choice variable available to the institution is the scholarship offer. Partially 
dififerentiating (4.14) with respect to the scholarship gives the ocpected change in net 
revenues generated finm the last dollar of grant aid offered to the group. 
^5i = N.[-F(AS,)+(T-S,)fl:As,)Al ('tis) 
The expected marginal revenue is the sum of the infra-marginal effect (the change in 
A 
revenue attributable to those already participating, which is - N,F(^2Si)) marginal 
effect (the change in revenue attributable to those people who start (or stop) participating, 
which is equal to N, (T - S, )f(ASi )A )• 
If the university is price discriminating, the marginal revenue of each group would be 
equal to the marginal cost of taking on one more student The hypothesis test of price 
 ^Vaxiables that represent school J do not enter diis analysis, dierefore, the stq>erscr^t denoting the school is 
dropped 
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discriminating behavior is 
^?ENR, ^?ENR2 
„ ^?ENR, <?ENR/ H.'.——— ^  —— 
Under this frameworic the expected revenue of recruiting one group relative to another 
group can be detennined The expected enrollment of groiq> 1  ^ product of the 
groiq) size and the probability  ^of enrolling which is positively related to the scholarship. 
EN. = NjFO§jS.) (4.17) 
Partially differentiating (4.17) with respect to the scholarship offer gives the marginal effect 
of a dollar of scholarship aid on the enrollment of group 1. 
—  ^= N,Afl:AS,) (4.18) 
For this discussion, consider two student groups, 1 and 2. The scholarships necessary to 
increase the enrollment of the first group by 1 student and decrease the enrollment of their 
counterpart, group 2, by 1 student are 
^  ^= 0,, AEN, =1 => AS, « — 
agjj ,^, where o is defined in (4.18). (4.19) 
-  ^= 0,, AEN, =-l => AS, « — 
Using the proximate changes in scholarship (4.19), the resulting change in revenue for each 
group is 
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= AENRi«AS,^i«— 
,^ ere0 is defined in (4.15). (4J20) 
^ =0^, AENR2«ASj^j«-i^2 
<7Sj 
Finally, the difiference in total revenue from increasing the enrollment of groiq) 1 by I student 
and decreasing the enrollment of groi^  2 by 1 student is 
AENR = AENRj + AENRj » 
(T-S,) ,^S,)A -F(ASi) (T-S,)fl:AS2)A -FCASZ) • (^-21) 
Aw,) A^zSz) 
Thus, the difference in expected marginal revenue is a function of the net tuition, the 
estimated pdf and CDF fiom the probit model, and the coefiScient on the scholarship (pj) 
each group. This requires two scholarship policies to be implemented simultaneously. One 
policy would be to increase the amount of grant aid to all women so that female enrollment 
increased by 1. The second policy would be to decrease the grant aid to all males so that 
male enrollment decreased by 1. The difference in revenues (gain or loss) are reported for 
the mutually exclusive pairs and relative to the full sample. 
Empirical Test #4: The expected enrollmeiit demand curve 
The probability of an ^ licant enrolling is negatively related to the gap between the 
actual and reservation scholarship (when the actual is less than the reservation) conversely, 
the probability of enrolling is monotonically decreasing in the net price, -
Given the estimated coefBcients from the probit model, define Sf ,^ the "a-level reservation 
scholarship", such that the probability of enrolling in equal to a, where (0 < a < 1), 
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FC5,Sr,) = a (422) 
This is the level of grant aid at which individual i, in groi^  1 has a predicted enrollment 
probability equal to a J la this example, contrary to most of the reservation wage/price 
literature, the individual's probabiliQr of participating is variable. Using the implicit function 
theorem, equation (4.22) can be rewritten as 
IL' S^XJ,Z^Z^flr). (4.23) 
(+) (-) w 
The student's a-level reservation net price (referred to as the reservation price) for which she 
has a probabili^  of enrolling equal to a is (T - ). For each enrollmoit probability, a, 
there exists a vector of net reservation prices of the form. 
pr = 
T-si:, 
T-St, 
T-sr  ^ (4.24) 
Assume that the reservation prices are arranged in descending order. The demand curve 
is defined by the set of Nx ordered pairs; 
(ai,T-S-), (4.25) 
where the first element is the probability of enrolling (a) multiplied by the index variable (i) 
 ^Altetnatively, if the univeisiQr chooses not to price disciiminate (Le. chaig  ^the same price to all applicants 
in a group) die probability ofemoU^wooldvaiy across individuals, bidiis case expected emoUment is die 
sum (over die ^ licant pool) of each mdividual's enrollment probability. Expected net levemie is the product 
of expected enrollment and die net price. The gr^b of diis line of thmlrfng is also presented m Ch^ter S along 
with calculations of e}q>ected enrollment and expected revenue under various tuition levels. 
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denoting the row of the vector.® The second element is the a-Ievel reservation price of 
attending.^  In this discussion two important assumptions are made. First, the university  ^is a 
perfect price discriminator, charging each applicant his reservation price. The second 
assumption is that if the university's price is above the ^ licant's reservation price the 
probability of enrolling is zero. 
Figure 4.13 illustrates the demand relationship for two probabilities of enrolling, at < a2. 
The end points of the demand curves are characterized by the im'nimiim and maximum 
reservation prices, the probability of enrolling, and the numba* of applicants. However, 
without the empirical results, the path between these end points is not clearly defined. 
Each enrollment probability has a individual with the highest net reservation price, 
defined as This price decreases as the probability of enrolling increases > P ,^ 
smce _£L_ <0 . Thus, the points (a,, P^) and PiSx) are well defined Qabeled 
I, J, respectively).^ ' The maximum expected enrollment under each probability scenario is 
the product of the total nimiber of a l^icants (NJ and the probability of enrolling (a). Thus, 
as the probability of enrolling increases, so does the maximum expected enrollment, 
= a,Nj < ajN, = . This defines the other end points of the two demand curves. 
* For example, if die lowest net piice were T - S j ^  and the piobabiliQr of enrolling was 0.50, dien expected 
enrollment would be (0 JO) * 1 or 0.50. Suppose mstead, die univeisity chaiged each of die first 200 iqiplicants 
their reservation price, under a 25 percent enrollment probabiliQr. The lowest price ofifered is (T- SjJ^),to 
die 200*  ^applicant The e^qiected enrollment under such a pricing scheme would be 50 applicants. 
' Since die index variable (i) is used in plotting die demand curve, it is crucial diat die reservation prices be 
sorted in descendmg order. 
Since die reservation prices are sorted in descending order P .^ = P . 
" Recall diat a is a probability, bounded between 0 and 1. 
i 
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Net Price: P = T-Si 
max 
Expected 
EmoUment 
E!' 
nm 
Figure 4.13: Expected enrollment demand curves for tviro enrollment probabilities, a, < a,. 
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(E ,^ PZ) and »labeled K, L, respectively. 
As stated, it is not theoretically possible to determine the path between the end points. In 
particular, it is not possible to determine if the demand curves will cross. This depends on 
the magnitude of the end points and the slopes of the curves. The curvature is influenced by 
the choice of distribution. Di the figure below, the normal distribution assumed in the current 
research is evident in the sh  ^of the demand curve. Figure 4.13 illustrates the case where 
the demand curves do cross. 
If the universi^  were able to perfectly price discriminate and charge each ^ licant his 
reservation price, the university could «ctract the entire consumer surplus. Thus, expected 
revenue would be the area under the demand curve and above the maTginal cost curve. 
Expected emx)Ilment would be determined by the probability  ^of enrolling times the number 
of applicants whose a-level reservation price is greater than or equal to the marginal cost of 
educating another student For students whose reservation price is below marginal cost, the 
university has no economic incentive to recruit them, siuce doing so would not generate 
sufScient revenues to cover the marginal cost 
The probit models for the admission and financial aid are presented in the next chapter. 
The four empirical questions are answered in the noct chapter for resident and nonresident 
applicants. 
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CHAPTERS 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS 
The enq)irical results of the admissions and financial aid models of the previous chapter 
aie presented here. Separate models for resident ^ licants and nonresident ^ ipUcants are 
presented. The data used in the admissions estimation covers 19 years, fix)m 1976 - 1994. 
The financial aid model is estimated with data finm 8 years, 198S - 1989,1992 - 1994. An 
overview of the data was presented in Ch t^ers 1,2, and 4. Chapters 4 and 5 deal solely with 
the enrollment decision of admitted first-time fieshmea applicants to ISU. 
The first section of this chapter discusses the results of admissions model (equation 4.7). 
The next section presents the findings fit>m the financial aid model (equation 4.8) and 
discusses the first empirical test Section 3 examines the behavior of the institution using the 
empirical tests 2,3, and 4. The estimated tuition and grant tradeoff from increasing a 
specific characteristic of the population are presented (empirical test #2). A discussion of 
price discriminating behavior is presented next. The last empirical test in this section shows 
the expected enrollment demand curve for the institution. Finally, the policy implications 
drawn fit>m the individual demand analysis are discussed. 
Admissions Model 
The results fix>m the probit estimation of the admissions model are reported in Table 5.1 
The resident sample includes 81,307 admitted admissions applicants, out of which 53,622 
eorolled. The nonresident sample includes 50,027 admitted prospective students fi»m which 
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Table 5.1: Probit regressioii results for admissions model, 1976 -1994. 
Vaiiable Resident Nonresident 
Intercept 1.584*^» 1.947*^» 
(127.937) (242.734) 
ISU Tuition/1,000 -0.220*»» -0.106*»» 
(22.669) (43.151) 
[-0.230] [-0.674] 
ISUDistancc/1,000 -0J03*»* -0.271*»» 
(30.917) (150.913) 
[-0.015] [-0.111] 
Alternative tuition/1,000 0.384*** 0.025 
(DMACC -Resident) (38 J25) (2.216) 
(Own-state public -I^) [0.257] [0.058] 
U of I Distance/1,000 -0.047 
(0.448) 
[-0.003] 
Local subsidy/100 2.089*** 
(27.470) 
[0.195] 
County Income/10,000 -0.006 -0.037** 
(0.063) (5.304) 
[-0.006] [-0.091] 
CoUege/HS Salary -0.651*** -1.142*** 
(46.634) (132.680) 
[-0.188] [-0.707] 
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Table 5.1: (Continued) 
Variable Resident Noniesident 
ACT/100 0.340»* -0.632»»» 
(5.609) (13.484) 
[0.045] [-0.148] 
Rank/100 -0.094*«  ^ -0.644»»» 
(8.644) (280.796) 
[-0.039] [-0.558] 
Female -0.116*** -0.071»^» 
(144.404) (32.871) 
[-0.029] [-0.033] 
Minority -0.151*»  ^ -0.135*** 
(20.131) (44.219) 
[-0.002] [-0.019] 
Parents Alumni 0233*** 0259*** 
(140.914) (69.945) 
[0.010] [0.015] 
College Choice -0.425*** -0.209*** 
(754.899) (122J39) 
[-1.454] [-1.556] 
Log Likelihood -51,040 -30,327 
Observations 81,307 50,027 
Events 53,622 15,892 
( ) Chi-Squared significance test 
[ ] Elasticities at the mean. 
*** Significant at 1 percent 
Significant at 5 percent 
* Significant at 10 percent 
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15,892 enrolled. Table 5.1 reports the coefficient, Chi-Squared test for significance and the 
point estimates of the elasticiQr (evaluated at the mean) for the variables used in the analysis.^  
The probit model elasticities indicate the change in the probability of participating from a 1 
percent change in the variable. 
The coefficient of ISU tuition is negative and significant for both residents and 
nonresidents. The elasticities are in the inelastic range, -0.23 and -0.67 for residents and 
nonresidents, respectively. A10 percent increase in resident tuition would lead to a 2.3 
percent decrease in the probability  ^of a resident applicant enrolling at ISU, all else constant 
A10 percent increase would lead to a 6.7 percent decrease in the probability of a nonresident 
enrolling. The &ct that nonresident applicants are 3 times more responsive to price than 
resident applicants is due, in part, to the higher tuition they &ce if th  ^attend ISU. It may 
also be a result of ISU resident tuition being correlated with tuition at the other 2 Iowa 
Regents institutions. 
This is also consistent with the aggregate findings of enrollment by state and county 
presented earlier. The state level nonresident own-price elasticity for first-time freshmen was 
-0.97, while the county-level resident first-time freshmen own-price elasticity was -0.088. 
The negative and inelastic own-price efifect of the individual analysis is consistent with the 
literature reviewed in Ch t^er 1. Corrazini et al. (1972) found an own-price elasticity for 
public (state level) enrollment of -0.027. Fuller, Manski and ^ ^e (1982) found the elasticity 
was -023, using longitudinal data. Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984) found an own-price 
' Table 4.1 provides a brief descr^tion of die variables used in the analysis, a detailed sununaiy is presented m 
the appendix. Appendix Table B3 presents standard eirots for the point estimates of the elasticities. 
i 
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elasticity of admitted students to Cornell University's public school to be -0^8. While 
nonresident emoUment at Iowa State may not be directly comparable to enrollment at either 
of the "selective colleges" ocamined in the literature (Ehrenberg and Shemian 1984 and 
Moore et aL 1991), the elasticity of nonresident tuition at ISU and the selective private 
schools are relatively close. Ehrenberg and Shennan showed the price elasticity for Cornell's 
private school was -1.09. The own-price elasticity estimated in the current research is very 
close to Moore's price elasticity of -0.72. 
The other measure for the cost of attending ISU is the distance from home. The 
coefficients are negative and significant for both samples. Holding all other variables at the 
sample averages, a 10 pocent increase in distance to ISU leads to a 1.5 percent or 11 percent 
decline in the probability of enrolling for resident and nonresident ^ plicants, respectively. 
Two measures of the price of competing educational opportunities are examined for 
residents and nonresidents. The distance to the University of Iowa and the tuition at Des 
Moines Area Community College (DMACQ are used for residents. The own-state public 
tuition and the local subsidy for higher education are used in the nonresident model. Tuition 
at DMACC is positively related to the probability of an ^ licant enrolling at ISU. A 10 
percent increase in tuition at the community college leads to a 2.5 percent increase in the 
probability of enrolling at ISU. The own-state tuition has a positive effect on the probability 
of an individual enrolling at ISU, but is not significant. In both cases the cross-price effects 
are positive, indicating that the alternative schools are substitutes for fi«shmen enrollment at 
Iowa State. 
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As distance from the ^ >plicants home to the University of Iowa increases, a resident 
applicant is less likely to enroll at Iowa State. The coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero. The local subsidy for higher education also has a positive effect The theory 
predicts that higher spending on home-state schools would decrease the probability of 
enrolling at ISU and that increased distance to alternative in-state schools would increase the 
probability of enrolling. The model indicates the opposite signs for these coefficients, 
however, only the local subsidy is significantly different from zero. 
Hoenack (1971) and Hoenack and Weiler (1975) ocamined aggregate enrollment at large 
public universities. Th  ^noted, as was found here, that tuition at in-state institutions is 
highly correlated over time. They used the distance measures to capture some of the 
variation in the cost of attending. However, in the current research, the coefficient of 
distance to U of I is not precisely estimated. Another problem that is especially important for 
the resident results, is that ISU tuition is highly correlated witii changes in tuition at the other 
Regents institutions. The high correlation among the tuition at Regents institutions may 
mean that the own-price elasticity reflects the change in the probability of a resident applicant 
attending ISU when tuition at the Regoits schools increases by 1 percent These issues 
indicate that even though the coefficient of ISU tuition is significant, it may not reflect the 
response of increased tuition at ISU, without similar increases at the other Regents schools. 
It is important to keep this in mind in the discussion of the enq)irical tests. 
Theory predicts that increases in income would be associated with increased ability to 
pay for college, and therefore, increase the probability of emolling. The resident probit 
jL 
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model shows that increases in county income lead to decreases in the probability of a resident 
l^icant enrolling at ISU. Similarly, the probability of a nonresident enrolling at ISU is also 
negatively related to county per c i^ta mcome. The income elasticities are -0.006 and -0.091 
for resident and nonresident applicants, respectively. The income coefficient for residents is 
not significant, and the nonresident coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level of 
significance. Periiaps the aggregation to the county level does not accurately reflect the true 
income of the families applying to ISU. On the other hand, it may indicate that increases in 
income lead to increased eniollment in private schools, and therefore declines in enrollment 
at Iowa State. Yet another explanation is that Iowa State, being a land grand institution, 
draws a large number of £ l^icants finm rural areas, which are traditionally lower income 
areas. 
The coefficient of the returns to college is negative and significant for residents and 
nomresidents. The returns to college are measured by national median salary of males with 4 
or more years of college over national median salary of males with a high school degree, 
adjusted for the unemployment rate and the 4 additional years of wage work for those who 
enter the labor force directly after high school.^  A10 percent increase in the returns to 
college leads to a 1.8 pocent decrease in the probability of a resident ^ licant enrolling and 
a 7 percent decline in the probability of enrolling for a nonresident q)plicant As the college 
wage premium increases ^ licants are less likely to enroll at ISU. The literature indicates 
that increases in wage g  ^between college and high school graduates increase the incentives 
 ^A similar adjustment was suggested by Otazem and Mattila (1991). 
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to attend college (i.e. shifts the demand for higher education out and to the tight) (Topel 1997 
and Katz and Muiphy 1992). It is not clear if the coefiGcient c t^ures a relative increase in 
probability of enrolling at other schools, or simply decreases the incentives to enroll at ISU. 
To determine this would require information on the applicants choice if th  ^did not enroll at 
ISU, which is not available. 
Two variables are used to measure the academic ability of an applicant, ACT test score 
and class rank. In the resident model, the coefiScient of the ACT score is positive and 
significant The coefScient on class rank is negative and significant at I percent While the 
elasticities for class rank and ACT scores are computed, it is not clear which effect 
dominates. The change in academic ability c t^ured by a 1 percent change in the ACT score 
does not necessarily equal the change in ability fiom a 1 percent change in &e class rank. At 
issue here is the fact that academic ability is not easily quantifiable. However, it is clear that 
the effects work in opposite directions. Therefore, with the admissions model results, it is 
not possible to conclude if resident ^ licants with higher academic abilities are more or less 
likely to enroll at Iowa State University. 
Li the nonresident model both coefiScients of the academic ability variables are negative 
and significant This indicates that, all else equal, individuals with a higher ACT score or 
higher class rank are less likely to enroll at ISU. Since both effects work in the same 
direction it is clear that nonresident ^ jplicants with higher academic ability (measured by 
ACT score or class rank) are less likely to enroll at Iowa State. 
The coefiBcients of the dummy variables for gender and ethnic minority are negative and 
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significant in both samples. The signs indicate that minonties and females are less likely to 
enroll at ISU. The three preceding results can be explained as follows. High ability, women, 
and ethnic minorities are sought after by institutions of higher education. Since these groups 
are more desirable, th  ^may have more options available to them. Therefore, they are less 
likely to enroll in any single school. This also indicates that despite the efforts that ISU may 
be conducting to recruit these groiqis, they remain less likely to enroll. 
If the applicant's parents are Iowa State alumni, the i^ licant is more likely to enroll. 
This coefficient is positive and significant for resident and nonresident applicants. One of the 
policy implications of this result (as well as the others in the model) is discussed in the 
second empirical question of tradeoff. The college choice variable is significant and has Oie 
anticipated negative sign. If ISU is listed as the student's first choice to receive their ACT 
scores, the applicant is more likely to enroll. The lower that ISU is placed on this list, the 
less likely it is that the prospective student will enroll. 
Finally, there are differences between the resident and nonresident models. The own-
price elasticity, and distance elasticities are very different The signs of the variables that 
appear in both models are the same, except for the ACT score. While the signs are generally 
the same, the magnitudes differ by a &ctor of at least 2. The difference in the price 
elasticities is sufi5cient to justify separate treatment of the two price effects. However, 
controlling for the difference by separate price variables (price interacted with a dummy 
variable for residency) would restrict the other coefBcients to be equal. These observations 
support using separate models for resident and nonresident applicants. 
i 
113 
Financial Aid Model and Empirical Test #1 
The results of the financial aid model (equation 4.8) are presented in this section. As before, 
separate regressions for resident and nonresident students are examined. Table 5.2 presents 
the results fixjm the probit analysis. These results have similar signs to those discussed 
previously for the admissions model. The first empirical test asks if the changes in tuition 
can be ofi^ et by equal changes in financial aid. The hypothesis of equal tuition and grant 
effects, described in equation (4.9), is rejected for residents and nonresidents. The log-
likelihood ratio test rejects that the effect of a dollar increase in grant aid is equal to the effect 
of a dollar increase in tuition for both groups.^  Therefore, the discussion of results focuses on 
the model with tuition and grant aid as separate regressors. 
The ISU price variables all have the anticipated signs. The coefScients of resident and 
nonresident tuition are negative and significant The elasticities (-0.24, -0.70) are very 
similar to those found in the admissions model (-0.23, -0.67). Sirenberg and Sherman 
(1984), found a more elastic response to price in the group of applicants that q)plied for 
financial aid. The current research is consistent with this finding, but the difference found is 
very small. A10 percent increase in tuition leads to a 2.4 percent decline in the probability 
of emt)lling at ISU for a resident financial aid applicant A10 percent increase in the 
nonresident tuition is associated with a 7 percent decline in the enrollment probability of a 
nonresident financial aid applicant 
The coefScient of grant aid is positive, but not significant in the resident model. A 10 
 ^ (1,.95) = 3.84, .2(ln L, -In LJ = -2(-14,943 - (-14,940)) = 5.535 (resident) 
-2(ln L, -In Lb) = -2(-8,086-(-8,082)) — 12\ (nonresident) 
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Table 52: Probit regression results: Financial aid model, 1985 - 1989,1992 - 1994. 
Variable Resident Nonresident Resident 
(Net Tuition) 
Nonresident 
(Net Tuition) 
Intercept 2.9AI*** 
(106.787) 
5.285*»» 
(307.001) 
2X21*** 
(101.460) 
5.065*» 
(304.826) 
ISU Tuition/1,000 -0232*** 
(6.732) 
[-0.238] 
-0.15l^ »* 
(18337) 
[-0.704] 
-0.026 
(1.963) 
[-0.005] 
-0.059»» 
(51.783) 
[-0.259] 
ISU Grant Aid/1,000 
(Predicted) 
0.023 
(1.480) 
[0.019] 
0.054»»» 
(42368) 
[0.117] 
ISU Distance/1,000 -0.057 
(0.355) 
[-0.003] 
-0.085** 
(4.047) 
[-0.026] 
-0.060 
(0388) 
[-0.003] 
-0.096»* 
(5.125) 
[-0.035] 
Alternative 
tuition/1,000 
(DMACC -Resident) 
(Own-state public -NR) 
0.218 
(0.905) 
[0.127] 
0.025 
(0.732) 
[0.041] 
-0.054 
(0.074) 
[-0.031] 
-0.011 
(0.167) 
[-0.028] 
U of I Distance/1,000 -0.346*** 
(7.458) 
[-0.020] 
-0.347»»» 
(7.502) 
[-0.020] 
Local subsidy/100 0.151 
(0.052) 
[0.010] 
-0.710 
(1.490) 
[-0.078] 
Parents AGI/10,000 0.066»»» 
(534.431) 
[0.082] 
0.104**» 
(918332) 
[0.064] 
0.065*** 
(529.035) 
[0.082] 
0.103** 
(912399) 
[0.273] 
College/HS Salary -1.699*^» 
(16.876) 
[-0.468] 
-6.037*** 
(122.873) 
[-2.735] 
-1.795»»* 
(19.002) 
[-0.495] 
-6.520»» 
(160.852) 
[-4.051] 
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Table 5.2: (Contmued) 
Variable Resident Nonresident Resident 
^et Tuition) 
Nonresident 
(Net Tuition) 
ACT/100 -1.574»»* 
(33.375) 
[-0.184] 
-1.053** 
(9.091) 
[-0.180] 
-1.577*** 
(33.504) 
[-0.184] 
-1.085** 
(9.671) 
[-0.253] 
Rank/lOO -0272*** 
(19.062) 
[-0.101] 
-1.006** 
(163.337) 
[-0.639] 
-0.266*** 
(18.301) 
[-0.099] 
-0.999** 
(161.349) 
[-0.851] 
Female -0.066*** 
(13.978) 
[-0.014] 
-0.049** 
(4.173) 
[-0.017] 
-0.067*** 
(14J59) 
[-0.014] 
-0.050** 
(4.425) 
[-0.022] 
Minority -0.157»»* 
(9.824) 
[-0.002] 
-0256** 
(52.690) 
[-0.026] 
-0.161*** 
(10.437) 
[-0.002] 
-0.269** 
(59.442) 
[-0.060] 
Parents Alumni 0.088*»* 
(9.735) 
[0.006] 
-0.017 
(0.115) 
[-0.001] 
0.108*** 
(16.440) 
[0.007] 
0.056 
(1.744) 
[0.006] 
College Choice -0.421 •»» 
(394.508) 
[-1.138] 
-0.188** 
(60.757) 
[-1.023] 
-0.420*** 
(392.823) 
[-1.136] 
-0.187** 
(60.409) 
[-1.196] 
Log Likelihood -14,940 -8,082 -14,943 -8,086 
Observations 25,536 13,872 25,536 13,872 
Events 17,961 5,017 17,961 5.017 
( ) Chi-Squared significance test 
[ ] Elasticities at the mean. 
*** Significant at 1 percent 
** Significant at 5 percent 
* Significant at 10 percent 
i 
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percent increase in grant aid results in a modest 0.1 percent increase in the enrollment 
probabili^  for resident financial aid i^ licants. This may lead to imprecise estimates for the 
empirical tests in the next section. The grant coefficient for nonresidents is significant, but 
the impact of a 10 percent increase in grant aid is only a 1 percent increase in the probability  ^
of enrolling. The net effect of increasing tuition and grant aid by 10 percent leads to a 2.2 
percent and 6 percent decline in the prob i^lity of enrolling for resident and nonresident 
applicants, respectively. The decision to enroll at ISU is not heavily influenced by the grant 
aid that an applicant is offered. 
One reason for the small effect may be from using the predicted award instead of the 
actual offer. However, the original award data were not available for the time period 
examined. A second reason for die small effect is that ttiis measure only includes grant aid. 
It is true that loans and woik-study do require future commitments fix)m the student 
However, as the federal budget allocations show, these financial aid instruments are widely 
used in financing higher education. The loan and work-study aid offer is hard to determine 
from the actual amount received since students may not accept the full amount offered. 
The coefficient on the distance from the applicants home to Iowa State is negative. It is 
significant at the S percent level of significance for nonresident ^ licants and not 
significantly different fit>m zero for residents. The distance elasticities in the financial aid 
model are less than one-fourth the magnitude of the distance elasticity in the admissions 
model. This indicates that financial aid qiplicants are less responsive to distance than are the 
group of admitted ^ licants. 
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Des Moines Area Community College and the in-state public institutions are substitutes 
for ISU freshman enrollment, with a cross-price elasticities of 0.13 and 0.04, respectively. 
The coefficients ate not precisely estimated. The price of ISU's largest competitor for 
resident students. The University  ^of Iowa, is highly correlated with ISlTs tuition. This 
maybe one reason the alternative college cost effects (U of I distance and DMACC tuition) 
are imprecise. The effect of the returns to college on the probability of enrolling are negative 
and significant, as found in the admissions model. 
Among financial aid applicants, enrolling at ISU is a normal good. The coefficient of 
parents adjusted gross income is positive and significant for resident and nonresident 
applicants. The elasticity is approximately equal across resident and nonresident qiplicants. 
A10 percent increase in &mily income would lead to a 0.8 and 0.6 percent increase in tiie 
probability of emnlling at ISU for resident and nonresident financial aid applicants, 
respectively. That enrollment in ISU is a normal good is consistent with the literature, but 
the studies examined in Chapter 1 found elasticities that were much larger. 
The coefficients of the academic ability measures show that financial aid applicants with 
stronger academic abilities are less likely to emoll at ISU. The signs of the coefficients for 
the ACT score and class rank are negative and significant for residents and nonresidents. An 
increase of 10 percent in the class rank is associated with a decline of I percent or 6.4 percent 
in the probability of enrolling for residents or nonresidents, respectively. Similarly, an 
increase in the ACT score by 10 percent leads to a 1.8 percent drop in the probability of 
enrolling at Iowa State for both groups. Among financial aid q)plicants, those with higher 
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academic abilities, measured by class rank and ACT score, are less likely to enroll at Iowa 
State University. 
The coefiGcients of the minority and female dunmy variables in the financial aid models 
are consistent with the admissions model. Female financial aid applicants are less likely to 
enroll than are males. Nfinority financial aid applicants are also less likely to choose to 
attend ISU than non-minority q>plicants. Again, the academic ability, gender, and minority 
variables show that groves that have more options available are less likely to enroll at Iowa 
State. 
The coefBcient for the parent's being alumni of ISU is positive for residents and negative 
for nonresidents. The admissions model has a positive effect for both. The coefBcient for 
the nonresidents is not significantly different fiom zero. Finally, the college choice variable, 
used to indicate interest in ISU, has the anticipated negative effect on enrollment 
In review, the financial aid model results are consistent with the admissions model as 
well as the anticipated signs in most cases. The own-price elasticities are in the inelastic 
range. The results indicate that financial aid i^plicants are more responsive to changes in 
tuition than changes in financial aid. Eligh ability, minority and female financial aid 
applicants are less likely to enroll at ISU. These findings have significant policy implications 
that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
i 
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Institiitional Behavior 
Empirical test it2: The tuition and grant tradeoffis 
The last three enq)irical tests are discussed in this section. The tradeo£& fiom targeting 
specific characteristics are shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for residents and nonresidents, 
respectively. These tradeofig show the change in tuition or grant aid that is required when 
there is a unit increase in one of the variables, while holding the probability  ^of enrolling and 
all other variables constant at the sanq)le averages. This is similar to comparing two 
"average" applicants, who aside finm a unit difference in a single characteristic, are identical. 
The dollar values given in the tables show the tradeoff of this difference in terms of the 
tuition or grant aid that would be required to equate the probability of both applicants 
enrolling. 
Columns I and 2 of Table 5.3 show the tuition tradeoff using the admissions and 
financial aid models, respectively. The third column shows the grant aid that is required to 
neutralize a change in the factor. For example, if tuition were to increase by $1, grant aid 
would need to increase by $10.19 to leave the probability of enrolling unchanged. Recall that 
the grant aid coefficient is not precisely estimated, so these effects are likely to be over­
stated. 
If there are two resident ^ licants who differ only in the distance to Ames, tuition for the 
person who lives 1 mile farther away would have to be reduced by $1.38 to equate the 
probability of enrolling. The distance results indicate that the scholarship tradeoff per mile is 
$2.52. 
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Table 5.3: Tuitioii tradeoff for a unit increase in a characteristic, for resident students 
Variable with a 
Unit Increase 
Admissions  ^
(Tuition) 
Financial Aid  ^
(Tuition) 
Financial Aid"* 
(Grant) 
ISU Tuition -1.00 -1.00 10.19 
(25.89) 
ISU Grant 0.10 -1.00 
(0.15) 
ISU Distance -1.38 -0.25 2.52 
(0.42) (0.67) (16.76) 
DMACC Tuition 1.75 0.94 -9.55 
(0.41) (1-33) (42.77) 
U of I Distance -0.22 -1.49 15.15 
(0.32) (1^7) (47.51) 
Income 0.003 0.03 -0.29 
(County Income Col 1) (0.010) (0.022) (820) 
parents AGI Col 2,3) 
College/HS Salary -2,965.56 -7,307.12 74,469.32 
(867.59) (5,883.36) (220,288.93) 
ACT 15.50 -67.70 689.99 
(8.19) (52.21) (2160.77) 
Rank -4.29 -11.68 119.07 
(1.58) (9.37) (367.58) 
Female -527.89 -283.91 2,893.45 
(126.14) (240.68) (8,958.04) 
Minority -687.47 -674.00 6,868.94 
(226.26) (527.44) (21,66422) 
Parents Alumni 1,060.96 376.87 -3,840.76 
(316.00) (404.65) (14,250.73) 
College Choice -1,933.44 -1,810.86 18,455.11 
(478.51) (1345.61) (52,629.73) 
'' Uses admissions model Table 5.1 Column 1. 
 ^Uses financial aid model Table 5.2 Column 1. 
Uses financial aid model Table 5.2 Column 1, in terms of the grant aid. 
() Standard errors from a parametric bootstrap of 100 draws. 
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Table 5.4: Tuition tradeoff for a unit increase in a characteristic, for nonresident students. 
Variable with a 
Unitbicrease 
Admissions 
(Tuition) 
Financial Aid 
(Tuition) 
Financial Aia 
(Grant) 
ISU Tuition -1.00 -1.00 2.77 
(0.83) 
ISU Grant 0.36 -l.OO 
(0.12) 
ISU Distance -2.60 -0.57 1.57 
(0.49) (0.37) (0.90) 
Own-State Tuition 024 0.16 -0.45 
(0.16) (0.19) (0.57) 
Local Subsidy -3.51 10.04 -27.83 
(0.36) (52.45) (134.34) 
focome 0.03 0.07 -0.19 
(County Income Col 1) (0.016) (021) (0.03) 
(Parents AGI Col 2,3) 
College/HS Salary -10,818.16 -40,109.58 111,175.39 
(1,997.00) (14,565.70) (22238.57) 
ACT -59.86 -69.93 193.83 
(20.71) (31.19) (68.69) 
Rank -60.98 -66.82 185.22 
(9.48) (21.29) (37.89) 
Female -672.24 -324.45 89929 
(173.84) ( 217.52) (524.16) 
Minority -1,276.46 -1,69828 4,70728 
(311.32) (585.38) (779.16) 
Parents Alimmi 2,451.77 -113.72 315.22 
(593) (385.03) (-424.15) 
College Choice -1,981.73 -1,247.89 3,458.89 
(394.49) (443.54) (810.08) 
Uses admissions model Table 5.1 Column 2. 
'^Uses financial aid model Table 5.2 Column 2. 
 ^ Uses financial aid model Table 5.2 Column 2, in terms of the grant aid. 
() Standard errors fix>m a parametric bootstrap of 100 draws. 
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The resident model shows that an increase of $1 in real tuition at DMACC would allow 
ISU to increase tuition by $1.75 without affecting the probabili^  of an average individual 
enrolling. The impact of a $1 increase in county income or parents adjusted gross income are 
very small. To maintain the same probability  ^of enrolling when county income increase by 
$1, tuition could increase by less than three-tenths of a cent Each dollar increase in parental 
income requires tuition to increase by 3 cents, or grant aid to decrease by $0.29, to hold the 
probability of enrolling constant. 
The measures of academic ability, minority status, and gender are also of interest In the 
resident sample, each unit increase in the class rank requires a $4.29 decrease in tuition or a 
$ 119 increase in scholarships. An increase in the ACT score allows ISU to increase tuition 
by $15.50 and leave the probability of enrolling unchanged when the admissions model 
results are used. An increase in the ACT score of 1 point, however, does require an increase 
in grant aid of $690 with the financial aid model. If two ^ licants differ only by gender, to 
eqiiate the probability of enrolling, the female's tuition would be reduced by $527, or her 
grant aid could be increased by $2,893. A minority applicant would require a $687 tuition 
cut or a $6,868 grant aid increase, to make the probability of enrolling equal. Finally, if the 
parents of the applicant attended ISU the model indicates that they would have the same 
probability of enrolling as an ^ plicant whose parents did not attend ISU, were the tuition 
$1,060 higher. This indicates that those ^ licants who are children of aliunni are more 
likely to attend, even if the price is increased. 
Ibi the nonresident sample, similar results are obtained. Briefly, the amount of grant aid 
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required to ofi^  a $1 increase in tuition is $2.77. Using the admissions model for 
nonresident applicants, if the home-state tuition goes up by $1, ISU nonresident tuition can 
increase by $0.24 and leave the piobabili^  of enrolling unchanged. If the distance mcreased 
by one mile, nonresident tuition would have to decrease by $2.57 to hold the probability of 
enrolling constant The "tuition per mile" is almost double for nonresidents relative to 
residents. This may be an indication of the large increase in tuition and other costs of 
attending ISU when an applicant crosses the state boundary. 
To hold the probability of enrolling constant, a unit increase in class rank requires a 
tuition reduction of $61 for a nonresident applicant Similarly, if the university wanted to 
increase the ACT score by 1 unit and maintain the same probability of enrolling, the required 
decrease in tuition would be $60. 
If the only difference between two individuals is minority status, to equalize the 
probability of enrolling the nonresident minority j^ licant would need a $1,276 decrease in 
tuition, or a scholarship increase of $4,707. Similarly, if the difference were gender, the 
nonresident female would require a decrease in tuition of $672, or a grant aid increase of 
$899. 
Empirical test #3: Price discriminatioii and switching revenues 
Tests for price discriminating behavior for the nonresident and resident samples are 
shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. These tests use the nonresident financial aid model with tuition 
and grant aid as separate regressors. Equation (4.15) shows the expected marginal revenue 
formula used here. The switching revenues are computed as shown in equation (4.21). The 
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Table 5.5: Expected marginal revenue and expected margmal value per applicant by groiq), 
for nonresidents. Using a parametric bootstrap of 100 draws. 
Group Sample Size Expected Marginal Switching Switching 
Marginal Net Value per Revenue Revenue 
Revenue wrt Student relative to across 
Grant Aid  ^ Full groups  ^
Sample  ^
Full Sample 13,820 -0.291 -16,754 
(0.010) (2,957) 
Female 5,714 -0267 -15,795 9595 1,604® 
(0.011) (2,823) (207) (342) 
Male 8,106 -0.308 -17,400 -645 
(0.011) (3,051) (135) 
Minority 2,878 -0.2765 -16,383 371 464 
(0.010) (2,727) (207) (435) 
White 10,942 -0J95 -16,847 -92 
(0.011) (3,019) (87) 
Top 5 2,518 -0.206 -12,844 3,910 4,701 
(0.010) (2,372) (629) (753) 
Lower 95*'' 11,302 -0.310 -17,545 -790 
(0.011) (3,077) (124) 
Equation 4.15. 
 ^ Equation 4.20. 
 ^ Equation 4.21. 
* Equation 4.21. 
This is the net change in revenue two scholarship policies. One increases the female 
enrollment by 1. The other decreases overall enrollment by 1. 
This is the net change in revenue ftom policies that increase female enrollment by 1 and 
decrease male enrollment by 1. 
() Approximate standard enors from a parametric bootstr  ^of 100 draws. 
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Table 5.6: Expected margmal revenue and ecpected marginal value per ^ >plicant by group, 
for residents. Estimates are from a parametric bootstrap of 100 draws. 
Group Sample Size Bcpected Marginal Switchmg Switching 
Marginal Net Value per Revenue Revenue 
Revenue wrt Student^  relative to across 
Grant Aid' Full Sanqile  ^ gtoiq>s* 
Full Sample 25,536 -0.701 
(0.004) 
-180,966 
(2,031,112) 
Female 11,491 -0.691 
(0.005) 
-175,497 
(1,966,411) 
5,469  ^
(66,375) 
10,075® 
(122,527) 
Male 14,045 -0.710 
(0.004) 
-185,572 
(2,085,865) 
-4,606 
(56,153) 
Minority 749 -0.654 
(0.017) 
-159,871 
(1,765,565) 
21,095 
(270339) 
21,774 
(279,100) 
White 24,787 -0.702 
(0.004) 
-181,645 
(2,039,722) 
-679 
(8.761) 
Top 5 3,599 -0.652 
(0.006) 
-159,780 
(1,774,837) 
21,186 
(256,387) 
24,916 
(301,746) 
Lower 95''* 21,937 -0.709 
(0.004) 
-184,696 
(2,076,452) 
-3,729 
(45,358) 
Equation 4.15. 
 ^ Equation 4.20. 
 ^ Equation 4.21. 
* Equation 4.21. 
This is the net change in revenue two scholarship policies. One increases the female 
enrollment by 1. The other decreases overall enrollment by 1. 
This is the net change in revenue firom policies diat increase female enrollment by 1 and 
decrease male enrollment by 1. 
() Approximate standard mors from a parametric bootstr  ^of 100 draws. 
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estimates are computed fiom a parametric bootstrs  ^of 100 draws.^  
The expected maigmal revenue of each student group is shown in column 2. The 
marginal revenue is negative for the full sample and for each subgroup. This would indicate 
that the universi^  is over-awarding grant aid from a revenue or profit maximizing 
perspective. On average, the last dollar of grant aid decreases net tuition revenue by 30 cents. 
The marginal revenue for each groi^  Qii^  ability/lower 95'*', minority/non-minority, and 
female/male) is also shown.^  The test for price discriminating behavior is equality  ^of 
marginal revenue across groups. Statistical tests regect that the marginal revenues are equal 
across the groups. ^  
Two conclusions can be drawn finm these findings. First, since the marginal revenue is 
negative, the University  ^is under-priced with respect to the net tuition, or over-awarding 
scholarships. This indicates that the University's behavior is more consistent with the goal of 
maximizing nonresident enrollment than maximizing nonresident tuition revenue. The 
results indicate that ISU is willing to pay for some nonresidents to attend. However, at the 
margin, that payment is less than a dollar. It may be the case that these students generate 
external benefits for the University, as Grossman (1995) discussed. Alternatively, this may 
be more precisely estimated if revenues fix)m room and board were included. 
Second, the Universi^  is not majciTniring revenue by price discriminating across the 
* SeeEfroaandTibshiram, 1993 andKinsl^aiulRobb 1986 for details of die paninetficbootstia|>. 
 ^ A high abiliQr student is defined by a class rank of 95 or above. Those students not m diis gioiq) are lefened 
to as die lower 95* .^ Recall diat die ISU admission standard requite diat a student graduate in die top half of 
dieir class for unconditional admission. 
' t-tests for equali  ^yield test statistics of94, 88, and 463 for femaleMiale, minoiity/non-minority, and high 
ability/lower 95th, respectively. 
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various groups of potential nonresident students. While the differences are statistically 
significant, they are not large in magnitude. The differences in marginal revenues across 
groups range fix)m 5 to 10 cents, not hundreds of dollars. Although the Universi^  is not 
equalizing marginal revenue fiom each groiq), the magnitude of the differences are relatively 
small. 
As discussed in Ch t^er 4, this framework can be extended to examme the change in 
revenues fiom changing the enroUment mix by 1 student The expected revenues from 
increasing enrollment of a groiq> by 1 and decreasing enrollment of the other groi^  by 1 are 
shown in Table 5.5: Columns 4 and 5. The findings relative to overall enrollment are that 
adding a female, minority, or high ability student leads to increases in net tuition revenue of 
$959, $371, or $3,910, respectively. If the overall enrollment were reduced and one more 
male, non-minority, or ^ licant in die lower 95"' percentile were added, revenues would 
decrease by $645, $92, or $790, respectively. Since females, minorities and high ability 
students consistently have a lower probability of enroUin  ^it seems that revenues would have 
to decrease in order to increase enroUment However, these results indicate tiiat the college 
may be able to increase the enrollment of the "more desirable" groups, and gain revenues in 
the process. 
The same results hold when the experiment is to increase enrollment of 1 groiq) 
(minority, female, or high ability) and decrease the enrollment of their counterpart (non-
minority, male, or lower 95 ,^ respectively). Recall, this requires two scholarship policies to 
be implemented. One policy increases the amount of grant aid to all female applicants so that 
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female eoroUment increases by 1. The second policy decreases the grant aid to all male 
s l^icants so that male enrollment decreases by 1. The results indicate that the decline in 
revenues from adding one more female would be larger than the decline in revenue fitmi the 
scholarship policy that decreases male enrollment by 1. Revenue from males would decrease 
less (or even increase) because the infra-marginal effect toward mcreased revenues (i.e. 
increased revenue from current male enrollment caused by a decrease in grant aid) outweighs 
the marginal effect toward reduced revenues 0.e. decreased revenue from decreased male 
enrollment). This is due in part to the difference in enrollment rates between the groups. As 
discussed in the beginning of Ch t^er 4, the enrollment rates of females, minorities and high 
ability students are below the enrollment rates of the overall ^ )plicant pool. Therefore, the 
enrollment rates of males, non-minorities, and applicants in the lower 95  ^must be above the 
average enrollment rates. 
The results of the tests for price discrimination among resident financial aid applicants 
are shown in Table 5.6. Since the state heavily subsidizes resident education, the marginal 
revenue from residents is much lower than the nonresidents. For all resident £ l^icants, the 
last dollar in scholarships decreases net tuition revenues by S0.70. This is an indication that 
resident students receive larger subsidies than nonresident students. While it can be argued 
that tuition of nonresident students covers the cost of their education, this is certainly not the 
case for resident students. In spite of subsidizing their services for resident students, the 
University can still price discriminate by charging different net prices to different resident 
applicants for the same service. 
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The tests for maximizmg revenue by price discrimination are rgected. The marginal 
revenues are not equal, statistically. However, the difference in males and females is less 
than 2 cents. Nfinority  ^and non-minority  ^students have a difference in marginal revenues of 
almost S cents. The largest difference for the resident ^ licants is the high ability and lower 
QS*** groups, which is only S.7 cents. Again, if the University is not setting prices to equate 
marginal revenues, they are relatively close to such a policy. The magnitudes are relatively 
small, as found in the nonresident case. It is also important to note that the coefScient of 
grant aid for residents was not significantly different finm zero. Therefore, these results may 
be imprecisely estimated as well. 
Another issue with these results is that they examine policies that change the price for the 
entire group. The estimates for increasing enrollment of 1 group and decreasing enrollment 
of another group are veiy imprecise, as shown by the large standard errors. Clearly, as is one 
goal of this research, scholarship policies can be specific to the individual. The individual's 
reservation price and the resulting demand curve for enroUmait at ISU are discussed in the 
next section. The institution can use the predicted reservation price information to 
strategically award financial aid. 
Empirical test #4: The expected enrollment demand cnrve 
The fourth empirical test suggests a method for deriving the expected emollment demand 
curve. This uses the financial aid model to predict each l^icants "a-level net reservation 
price". The demand curve discussed in Chapter 4 shows the expected enrollment at each net 
price, for a specific enrollment probability. Along a given demand curve, expected 
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enrollment and reservation prices change, but the probability of enrolling is constant 
Before illustrating the demand curve that holds probability fixed, and detemiines the 
maximum willingness to pay, it may be helpful to have some idea about the probability of 
enrolling at current prices. Figures 5.1 to 5.4 show the number of applicants at each 
probability of enrollment for current tuition and a 10 percent increase in tuition for 
nonresidents (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) and residents (Figures 53 and 5.4). These probabilities 
are estimated using the admissions model presented in Table 5.1. Under current tuition, the 
median probability of enrolling for residents is 68 percent and 30 percent for nonresidents. 
The 0q)ected revenue under the current tuition policy is 7.4 million from residents and 4.7 
million finm nonresidents. Expected enrollment is 832 for nonresidents and 3,500 for 
residents.^  
Suppose that the university wanted to examine the impact of a price change on expected 
enrollment The sensitivity to price changes at the aggregate level should be determined 
using aggregate data, as presented in Chi^ ters 2 and 3. These individual results are useful in 
examining how the distribution of enrollment probabilities change, not the aggregate price 
elasticity. Figures 5.2 and 5.4 show the distribution of enrollment probabilities for a 10 
percent increase in tuition. The histograms under price changes are ahnost parallel shifts of 
the current price figures. Notice also that the height (number of applicants) is decreased in 
the 10 percent tuition graph. The ^ ected enrollment unda a 10 percent tuition increase is 
3,431 resident students and 826 nonresidents. These calculations use the admissions model. 
 ^The average fiist-tiine freshmen enroUmeiit at ISU, from 1976 - 1994, was 4,019 residents and 1,140 
nonresidents. 
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Figure 5.1 Enrollment probability of a(totted resident applicants, 1985-1989,1992-1994. 
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intuition, 1985-1989,1992-1994. 
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but simulate the enrollment probabilities for a 10 percent tuition increase. Expected revenues 
under a 10 percent tuition increase would be 8 million for residents and 5.12 million fiom 
nonresident tuition. 
Finally, the expected enrollment demand curves for 3 enrollment probabilities (50,25, 
and 10 percent) are plotted in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. These gr^hs use the results fiom the 
financial aid model, with tuition and grant aid as separate regressors. Therefore, these 
calculations represent enrollment of financial aid ^ licants, not enrollment of all admitted 
applicants.^  Along a demand curve the probability  ^of enrolling is constant and the 
reservation price varies. The panels A, B, and C show the expected enrollment and 
reservation price relationship described in equation (4.24) for a = 50,25, and 10 percent, 
respectively. The revenue calculations use constant marginal cost equal to 0 and assume 
perfect price discrimination. The expected enrollment and expected net revenue fiom tuition 
are given in each panel. 
The nonresident demand curve for a 50 percent enrollment probability is shown in Figure 
5.5, Panel A. The model predicts that 288 financial aid applicants are expected to enroll. 
Under a 25 percent target, expected enrollment increases to 368 students per year. Of the 
three probability targets shown, the 25 percent probability of enrolling maximizes expected 
net revenue. Revenues from tuition, under perfect price discrimination, would be $4.37 
million from nonresident ^ licants. The assumption of perfect price discrimination is that 
each students pays his reservation price. 
 ^Over die years included in die &iancial aid model, die average number of resident financial aid applications 
was 3,201, of which 2,251 enrolled. The average number of nonresident financial aid applicants was 1,744 and 
eoroUment was 630. 
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The demand curve can be used to illustrate how to strategically award financial aid. The 
horizontal line in panel B represents current tuition. Those ^ licants whose reservation 
price is above tuition should receive no grant aid. There are 268 £ l^icants whose 
reservation price is above fbe tuition (with a 25 percent enrollment target). For these 268 
financial aid q>plicants, the model predicates that at a 25 percent probability of enrolling, 
they are willing to pay at least fiill price to attend ISU (with a 25 percent probability of 
enrolling). Applicants whose reservation price is above marginal cost and below tuition 
should receive a scholarsh  ^equal to the difference between tuition and their reservation 
price. In panel B these are the 269'*' to 368"' financial aid applicants. Those ^ licants who 
have a reservation price below the marginal cost should not be awarded financial aid, since 
the price they are willing to pay is below the marginal cost of educating them. 
If the university wanted to maximize enrollmoit, would pick tiie target probability 
that had maximum expected enrollment. If th  ^were interested in maximizing revenue, they 
would pick the target probability that maximized expected revenues. However, if the goal 
were some mix of the two, an optimal probability of enrollment may be more difScult to 
determine. For the 3 nonresident enrollment probabilities shown here, a 25 percent target 
would maximize expected enrollment and expected revenues. 
Figure 5.6 shows the expected enrollment demand curves for resident financial aid 
applicants. In these samples, expected enrollment is maximized under a 50 percent 
probability of enrolling, while expected revenues are maximized under a 25 percent 
probability of enrolling. The optimal choice of a target depends on the relative importance of 
137 
each of the two goals. If the financial siqipoit from other sources, such as the state subsidy, 
is tied to enrollments, the goal of maximizing emoUmoit will receive more weight 
The reservation prices for residents are much higher than the reservation prices for 
nonresidents. The maximum reservation price of residents is almost double the nonresident 
maximum. This indicates that large number of resident students are willing to pay to attend 
ISU. bi the 50 percent probability of enrolling, there are 1,SSS resident financial aid 
applicants willing to pay some positive price to attend ISU. For all but the last 100 of these 
applicants, the price they are willing to pay is above S10,000. For comparison, average 
resident tuition over the period is a modest S2,I31.^  
Conclnsion 
The results foimd in the admissions and financial aid models are generally consistent with 
economic theory and previous literature. The own-price elasticities are consistently in the 
inelastic range and statistically different from zero. While the resident financial aid model 
imprecisely estimates Ae response to grant aid, the coefScient in the noruesident sample is 
significant. These elasticities indicate that a 10 percent increase in the price of attending ISU 
leads to a decrease in the probability of enrollmg in ISU of less than 10 percent, for an 
average q)plicant. 
The financial aid model found that changes in tuition lead to a larger enrollment response 
than do changes in grant aid. Therefore, if the University were to target a group of students 
' Hie excessively high willingness to pay might be due to die imprecise coe£Bcient of grant aid obtained in die 
resident financial aid model (Table 52 Column 1). A small coefficient (P2) will nnply a larger scholarsh  ^to 
equate the probabilities (Equation422). The same issue is seen in die nonresident model (Table 52 Column 
2), but is not as pronounced as m die resident demand. 
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by lowering their price, the tuition and grant elasticities suggest that the impact on net tuition 
revenues can be minimized by using tuition as the policy instrument, instead of grant aid. 
However, grant aid can be awarded strategically, while tuition is set for the entire student 
body (either resident or nonresident). The tradeoff of a 1 dollar increase in nonresident 
tuition, to hold the probability  ^of enrolling constant, is an mcrease in the average nonresident 
grant award of $2.77. Therefore, if tuition is set above the optimal level, the increase in 
financial aid to compensate for the tuition is rather large. The optimal tuition policy was 
examined in Ch t^er 3, using aggregate data. The results may also be imprecise as a result of 
using the predicted grant, since the actual offer data were not available. 
The results also indicate that high ability students, minorities and females are less likely 
to enroll at ISU. There are programs to increase the presence of women in science and 
engineering, stated goals of increasing the number of national merit scholars on campus, and 
a continued interest in increasing the ethnic diversity on campus. However, even with these 
programs the targeted groins are less likely to enroll. An extension of the current research 
would be to remove the presence of special programs that attract these groups, and simulate 
the enrollment of each group. This would test if the programs are indeed increasing the 
enrollment of the desired groups on campus. 
Finally, using the framework presented in the 4*** empirical question, an estimate of the a-
level reservation price of enrolling at Iowa State University is determined. A lower net 
reservation price means that the student requires a larger scholarship to reach the targeted 
probability of enrolling. Another extension of the current research would be to map the 
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relationship between expected revenue and expected enrollment over the entire range of 
enrollment probabilities. 
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CHAPTER6 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation ocamined undergraduate enrollment at die aggregate and individual 
level. Chapter I introduced the national time trends of the fiu:tors that influence the demand 
for higher education. The current status of the literature dealing with the demand for higher 
education at the aggregate and individual level was also presented in Cluster 1. Chapter 2 
presented a two-stage theoretical model for examining aggregate enrollment at a single 
institution. This model defined the factors that influence enrollment nationally and those that 
influence enrollment at the institution. The results for nonresidents were presented in the last 
section of Chapter 2. Chapter 3 focused on resident enrollment by county, using the same 
model set forth in Chapter 2. Chapters 4 and 5 raamined the individual's decision to enroll 
in college, using separate models for the admissions and financial aid ^ licants, as well as 
resident and nonresident s^plicants. 
Nonresident State Level Empirical Results 
This section reviews the findings of the aggregate state level analysis. Li 7 out of 10 
cases the signs of the coefBcients are the same for all three dependent variables, first-time 
fireshmen enrollment, undergraduate enrollment and the number of s l^ications for 
admission. The ^ tors that influence national enrollment in college are per c i^ta income, 
the returns to college, public spending toward primary education, and the number of high 
school graduates. A10 percent increase in family income would cause an estimated 16 
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percent increase in nonresident first-time fiieshmen enrollment This suggests that 
nonresident enrollments are procyclical, rising during expansions and contracting during 
recessions. 
State expenditures on primary and secondary education had a positive inq>act on 
nonresident emx)llments fiom that state. The elastid  ^implies that a 10 percent increase in 
per pupil primary and secondary expenditures increases ISU nonresident freshmen 
enrollments by 9.4 percent The coefBcient of the college graduate over high school graduate 
wage ratio was positive, but not significant While the estimate was imprecise, it implied that 
a 10 percent increase in the returns to college would increase nonresident freshmen 
enrollments by 16 percent and undergraduate enrollment by 10 percent 
Changes in the number of high school graduates have not adversely affected nonresident 
enrollments at ISU. hi &ct, the litoal interpretation of the estimated effect indicated that 
decreases in the number of high school graduates over the poiod actually led to an increase 
in nonresident fiieshmen emnllmoits, other things equal. 
Three variables c t^ured the ^ tors that influence enrollment at the instimtion being 
examined. Two measures cs t^ured the cost of attending ISU. The own-price elasticity of 
demand was significant and marginally in the inelastic range. The elasticities for first-time 
freshmen enrollment and undergraduate enrollment were -0.971 and -0.723, respectively. 
This suggests that revenues fiom tuition are very close to the revenue maximizing level, and 
that a policy holding real tuition constant would be optimal. The other measure of the cost of 
attending ISU was distance fix>m Ames. The coefiBcient was negative and significant for all 3 
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dependent variables. States fiuther from Ames tend to have fewer freshmen attending ISU. 
The other institution specific variable captures tastes for ISU. The number of alumni in a 
state had a positive and significant effect on first-time nonresidoit enrollment, indicating that 
those states with more alumni tend to have larger nonresident freshmen enrollments and 
applications. 
The remaining variables entered &e demand for higher education in both the conditional 
demand for a specific institution and the decision to attend college in general. The 
coefficient on the price of an alternative institution for ISU was positive but not significant. 
This indicates that increases in the resident tuition of other states leads to larger nonresident 
freshmen enrollments at ISU. The home state subsidy of resident public higher education 
had a negative and significant effect on ISU nonresident freshmen enrollments. 
The robiismess of the results above was tested by regressing ISU nonresident 
undergraduate enrollment and nonresident plications for admission to ISU on the same set 
of explanatory variables. The results were similar to those found using first-time nonresident 
freshmen enrollment These results suggest that nonresident tuition is set at the revenue 
maximizing level. 
Resident Enrollment by Connty  ^
The same theoretical framework was used to examine resident enrollment at ISU by 
county. The same three dependent variables were analyzed in this section as well. In 
general, high school graduates played an important role in determining the number of first-
time freshmen and the number of applications for admissions, but not undergraduate 
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eoroUment The models of first-time ftesfamen and applications for admissions were 
consistent with theory and previous empirical research. 
The &ctors that influence enrollment in college used in this model were the per cq>ita 
income, returns to college, and number of high school graduates. Per capita income and high 
school graduates were at the county  ^level. To measure the esqiected increase in income with 
a college degree, the ratio of national median college graduate over high school graduate 
salaries was used. The coefiBcient of per capita coun  ^income was positive and significantly 
different fiom zero. The income elasticity was 0.569, which indicates that ISU enrollment is 
a normal good and in the "necessity" range (less than I). A10 percent increase in real per 
c i^ta coimty income would lead to a 5.7 percent increase in first-time resident enrollmoit at 
ISU. Resident enrollment was less sensitive to business cycles than nonresident enrollment. 
The coefBcient of the number of high school graduates in a county was 0.937. The 
impact of a 10 percent increase in high school graduates was predicted to be 9.4 percent 
Statistical tests did not reject that first-time resident enrollment changes in direct proportion 
to the number of high school graduates in Iowa. The coefficient of college over high school 
salaries was positive but not significantly different finm zero. First-time resident enrollment 
at Iowa State does not appear to have responded to the recent increases in returns to college. 
The own-price elasticity of first-time resident enrollment at ISU was -0.088. This is in 
the inelastic range and the coefficient was not statistically significantly different fiom zero. 
The model predicts that a 10 percent increase in resident tuition would lead to an enrollment 
decline of less than I percent, so that aggregate tuition revenues would increase substantially. 
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This small price elasticity may be misleading in that evoy price increase at ISU is 
accompanied by a similar increase at the University  ^of Iowa and UNI. Therefore, this 
elasticity represents the net effect on ISU resident fieshmen enrollment of a price increase at 
all three Regents schools. If ISU tuition were to increase while fees at the U of I and UNI 
remained constant, the implied reduction in enrollment would be larger. The distance from 
Ames had a negative and significant effect on ISU enrollments. Counties that are &rther 
fix)m Iowa State tend to have smaller enrollments, all else equal. 
Two measures of the cost of alternative opportunities for higher education were 
examined, distance to the U of I and 2-year college tuition. Counties that are &rther fiiom the 
University of Iowa tended to have larger freshmen enrollment at Iowa State. The impact of 
distance (in absolute value) was greater on ISU than on the University of Iowa. Since tuition 
at ISU and the U of I are virtually identical, distance from home represents one way that the 
cost of enrollment differs between the two schools. The distance results suggest a policy of 
offering larger scholarships to resident ^ licants as distance from ISU increases and as 
distance to the U of I &lls. The national average two-year public college tuition positively 
affects ISU first-time resident enrollment, however, the coefScient was not significantly 
different from zero. While the coefficient was inq)recise, a 10 percent increase in the price of 
two-year colleges would lead to a predicted increase in first-time resident freshmen of only 2 
percent 
To test the robustness of the previous results, applications for admission by county was 
regressed on the same set of explanatory variables. Signs on coefficients were identical 
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across the two regressions and the income and price elasticities were similar in magnitude. 
bidividoal's EnroUment Decision 
Chapters 4 and 5 examined tiie admitted a l^icant's decision to enroll in higher 
education. Admissions and financial aid records were used to examine what &ctors 
influenced enrollment at Iowa State as well as modeling the behavior of the institution. The 
probit model was used to determine the probability  ^that an individual would enroll, given 
they had applied and been admitted to ISU. The empirical results were used to determine the 
individual's a-level reservation price for enrolling. Sq>arate regression were run for resident 
and nonresident applicants. Since only a portion of the ^ licants applied for financial aid, a 
separate model was tested for the subset of students who ^ lied for financial aid. 
The findings indicate that increases in tuition lead to declines in the probability of an 
applicant emx)lling. The own-price elastities in the admissions model were -0.67 and -0.23, 
for nonresidents and residents, respectively. In the financial aid model, applicants were less 
likely to enroll as the tuition increases, with elasticities of similar magnitude. Distance to 
ISU was also used as a cost of attending. The coefficient of distance was negative and 
significant for both residents and nonresidents. The financial aid ^ licants were less 
responsive to distance than all admissions applicants. Furthennore, according to Savoca 
(1990) these elasticities do not include the probability of enrolling, which in the aggregate 
model was -0.69 for nonresidents. The sum of the two elasticities would be -1.36, which is in 
the elastic range. This would be the own-price elasticity of an average individual prior to the 
application decision. 
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Per capita coimQr income did not strongly influence the enrollment decisions of admitted 
l^icants. The effect of parents income on the probability of mroUing among financial aid 
applicants was also relatively small. A10 percent increase in the parents adjusted gross 
income led to a less than 1 percent increase in the probability  ^of enrolling for financial aid 
applicants. The college over high school salary measure negatively influenced the 
probability of enrolling at ISU. This may indicate that increased returns to college have 
shifted the q)plicants decision away fiom ISU toward enrollment at other schools. 
The empirical results indicated that females, minorities and high ability students were less 
likely to enroll at ISU. These groups may be recruited by other institutions, and therefore 
have more college options available to them. Finally, those applicants whose parents are ISU 
alimmi were more likely to enroll at Iowa State. 
The individual level analysis posed 4 empirical questions. The first question dealt with 
the behavior or response of the individual, while the last three dealt with the institutions 
behavior. The first question was. Can increases in tuition be offeet with equal increases in 
grant aid? The financial aid model rgected the hypothesis that the two effects were equal. In 
fact, a 10 percent increase in scholarships led to an estimated 1 percent increase in the 
probability of a nonresident enrolling at ISU. A10 percent increase in tuition would have led 
to a 7 percent decline in the probability of enrolling. It is clear that the effects are not equal, 
but result in a net decline in the probability of enrolling. 
The second issue examined was. Holding the probability of enrollment constant, how 
much must tuition increase to increase a desirable student attribute (academic ability or 
J 
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protected groiq> status)? This section determined the change in tuition required to equate the 
probability of enrolling for two average applicants, who aside finm a unit difference in a 
single characteristic, were identicaL If the difference was gender, the nonresident female 
applicant requires a tuition reduction in tuition of $672 or an increase in grant aid of $899 to 
equate the probability of enrolling. Likewise, if the difference was ethnic background, to 
equate the probability of enrolling, the minority q)plicant required an increase in grant aid of 
$4,707 or a decrease in nonresident tuition of $1,276. 
Grant aid must increase $2.77 to hold the probability of enrolling constant, when 
nonresident tuition was increased by 1 dollar. For resident students, the required increase in 
grant aid to compensate for a $1 increase in tuition was $10.19. However, this result was 
imprecise, since the coefQcient of grant aid was not precisely estimated and it is likely that 
the own-price effect was likely xmder-stated because of the correlation with the tuition at the 
University of Iowa. The model found that a nonresident i^ licant whose parents were ISU 
alumni would have the same probability of enrolling as a nonresident applicant whose 
parents were not ISU alumni, if tuition increased by $2,451. 
The third question tested if the institution maximizes revenues by price discriminating. If 
the institution is maximizing revenue, the marginal revenue of each group would be equal to 
marginal cost The model found that the marginal revenue was negative for both 
nonresidents and resident s l^icants. This means tiiat the last dollar of financial aid reduces 
net tuition revenue by more than 1 dollar. This indicates that ISU was "over-awarding" 
financial aid, if the goal of the university were revenue maximization. Another interesting 
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finding of this section was that the loss in revenue at the margin was twice as large for 
residents, relative to nonresidents, (-0.70 and -0.29, respectively). This indicates that resident 
students were receiving a larger subsidy at their state institution than nonresidents. 
The findings on price discrimination were mixed. Statistically, the marginal revenues 
were not equal. However, the magnitude of the difference was relatively small, ranging finm 
2 to 10 cents. The cost of increasing enrollment of one groiq>, while decreasing enrollment of 
another, indicates that adding a female, minority, or high ability student would lead to an 
increase in revenues. Since the enrollment rates of males, non-minorities, and the lower 95"* 
students were higher than the average, a decrease in their scholarships did not have as large 
of a negative effect on revenues as the negative impact that would result finm attracting a 
student fix>m the other group (female, minority or high ability). The results indicated that the 
university could increase the enrollment of the more desirable groups and gain revenues in 
the process. 
The last section of the individual analysis presented the individual's a-level net 
reservation price for enrolling at Iowa State. Using these computed reservation prices, the 
demand for fi«shmen enrollment was drawn. Two types of grq)hs were shown to illustrate 
the demand for the institution. The first held the price constant and showed the changes in 
the probability of enrolling across individuals. The second held the probability of enrolling 
constant and showed the variation in reservation price across individuals. Expected 
enrollment and expected revenue were calculated for each type. The actual average annual 
enrollment was 4,019 residents and 1,140 nonresidents. Average revenues firom 1976-1994 
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were S8.56 million fiom resident tuition and S6.I1 million from nonresident tuition, not 
counting the reductions in tuition revenues fixnn financial aid.^  The model holding price 
constant predicted enrollment to be 3,500 residoits and 832 nonresidents. Expected revenues 
were estimated at S7.46 million and $4.69 million fiom residents and nonresidents, 
respectively. 
The model that held the probability of enrolling constant assumed that each applicant was 
charged their reservation price. The reservation price estimates may have been overstated 
because of the imprecise estimates of flie grant coefficient. The reservation price model, 
under a 50 percent probability  ^of enrolling, showed expected enroUment of 1,555 residents 
and 288 nonresidents financial aid s l^icants. Under a 25 percent probability of enrolling, 
expected resident enrollment was 795 and nonresident enrollment was projected to be 368. 
Estimates of expected revenues from residents were dramatically over-stated, since the price 
coefiBcients were imprecise. The nonresident revenue under perfect price discrimination 
ranged from S4.37 million to $2.21 million for a 25 and 50 percent probability of enrolling. 
Finally, a method for strategically allocating scholarships was, illustrated with the 
dCTiand curve under prefect price discrimination. For each applicant whose reservation price 
is above tuition, the financial aid should be set to zero. For those applicants whose 
reservation price is below tuition and above marginal cost, the University should offer a grant 
equal to the difference betweoi tuition and their reservation price. Finally, those students 
who have a reservation price below marginal cost should not be offered financial aid. The 
' Average lesident and nonresident tuition fiom 1976 -1994 is S2,131 and SS,637, lespectively. 
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model predicts that these applicants would lequro so much financial aid that the marginal 
revenue would be below the marginal cost 
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APPENDIX A 
DISCUSSION OF AGGREGATE VARIABLES 
This project utilized data for each state m the United States. Data for Washington, D.C., 
was omitted. Data was recorded in cuzrent (nominal) dollars and changed to constant (real) 
dollars by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 1987, using 1994 as the base year. The time 
period used for this report is 1973 to 1994. The following is the list of variables used and 
their sources. The variable definitions are summaiized in Table 2.1. 
Variable DelEUiitions and Sources 
*Iowa State University EnroUmoit; This is the number of new ISU fall undergraduate 
enrollees and total undergraduate enrollment by state or county. Source: Iowa State 
University Enrollment Services Annual Statistical Report. 
*Iowa State University .^ iplications: The number of admissions plications per entry 
year, in each state or county. Source: data calculations. 
•Iowa State University Tuition and Fees: Annual nonresident tuition and fees were used 
as a measure of the cost of attending ISU for nonresidents. The annual measure 
automatically adjusts for the change fit>m quarters to semesters. Source: Iowa State 
University Enrollment Services Annual Statistical Report. 
• Alimmi: This is &e number of Iowa State alumni living in each state. Data were 
provided by the ISU Alumni Association and the Iowa State Fact Book. The data for 1983 
were not available. For that year, linear interpolation between the years of 1982 and 1984 
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was used. 
•Distance: The distance from Ames, Iowa (and Iowa City within Iowa) to each state or 
county. Uses latitude and longitude (in radians) for each zipcode. 
Dist = 3949.99(^rccos(sin(Tatl) • sin(lat2) + cos(latI) * cos0at2) • cosOongl - long2))) 
Fonnula provided by the Technical Siq>port team at the SAS Institute. 
•College Salary: National median annual salary of all males 25 and over, who have 
completed four or more years of college. Published in the Current Population Surrey. 
•High school salary: National median arwuial salary of all males 25 and over, who have 
completed 4 years of high school. Published in the Current Population Survey. 
•National relative annual salary: The ratio of college annual salary over high school 
salaty. 
•Higher education expenditures: The cuirent fimd expenditures of public institutions of 
higher education. This was reported in the Digest of Educational Statistics, published by the 
United States Department of Education, National Center of Educational Statistics.. 
•State subsidy for higher education: Higher education expenditures divided by the sum of 
the four previous years of high school graduates. This was used as a measure of quality and 
state support of higher education. 
•High school graduates: The number of public high school graduates in each state as 
reported in the Digest of Educational Statistics, by the United States Department of 
Education, National Center for Educational Statistics. 
•Own State Resident Tuition: A measure of tuition and fees for residents at public 
( 
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universities in the state. Three different sources were used to obtain tuition data. Ths Digest 
of Educational Statistics, complied by the United States Department of Education, National 
Center for Educational Statistics, provides state average tuition and fees at public 4-year 
universities. This is the most reliable data and was used whenever available (1981,1983, 
1986,1989, and 1991 - 1994). Tuition and fees were also taken fiom Barron's Profiles of 
American Colleges and The College Blue Book. These two sources listed data for individual 
schools rather than a state average. The 4-year public university with the largest enrollment 
was used from each source. The institutions are listed in Appendix Table 1. Barron's was 
used when available (1963,1967,1971,1973 and 1981). The College Blue Book was used to 
fill in the years when Barron's was not available (1978 and 1980). Linear interpolation was 
used when there was no data for a given year. 
Using two measures of college tuition and fees poses a problem of comparability. Since 
the Digest of Educational Statistics reported state averages and the other two sources used 
individual college the two observations are not con^arable. To remove this problem the 
following weighting method was used. 
Let 
Dti =Digest Of Educational Statistics observation for the average 4-year tuition and fees for 
the t^  time period and the i^  state. 
B f i  =  B a r r o n ' s  P r o f i l e  o f  A m e r i c a n  C o l l e g e s  observation of the largest school's tuition and 
fees for the t*  ^time period and the i^  state. 
Tfi = The observation used in the regression analysis for the t^  time period and the i^  state. 
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Then 
Dtu 
T.i = 
Bti for t < 1981 
(1) 
)« for t  ^1981 
This translates all observations into units consistent with the Digest of Educational 
Statistics. 
•E i^blic School Expenditure: The current fund expenditure per piq)il in average daily 
attendance in public elementary and secondary schools was used as a quality measure 
specific to each state. Reported by the U.S. Department of Education, National Center for 
Education Statistics in the Digest of Educational Statistics. 
'Consumer Price Index (1987): Reported by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics in the Statistical Abstract. Standardized to 1994 in the analysis. 
•Per c i^ta Licome (by state): The state personal income per c i^ta in current dollars. It 
is published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business in the 
Statistical Abstract. 
•Per cq)ita hicome (by county): County income per capita in current dollars. Published 
by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Economic and Statistical Administration, 
Regional Economic Information System (REIS), REIS CD-ROM. 
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Table A. 1: Universities selected to represent the state when Barron's Guide to Colleges and 
The College Blue Book were the source for information on tuition and 
room-and-board. 
State histitutiuu State Institution 
Alabama Auburn Montana Montana State Univ. 
Alaska Univ. of Alaska at FaMnoks Nebraska Univ. of Nebraska at Lmcoln 
Amona Arizona State Univ. Nevada Univ. of Nevada at Reno 
Arkansas Univ. of Arkansas at Fayetteville New Hampshire Uoiv. of New Hiuiqishire 
Califoxsia Univ. of California at L. A. New Jersey Rutgers Univ. & College 
Colorado Univ. of Colorado Boulder New Mexico Univ. of New Mexico 
Connecticut Univ. of Connecticut NewYoric State Univ. of NY at Bu£&lo 
Delaware Univ. of Delaware N.Carolma Univ. of N. Carolina Chapel Hill 
Florida Univ. of Florida Gainesville N.Dakota Univ. of N. Dakota 
Georgia Univ. of Georgia Athens Ohio Ohio State Univ. 
Hawaii Univ. of Hawaii Mmoa Oklahoma Oklahoma State Univ. 
Idaho Univ. of Idaho Moscow Oregon Oregon State Univ. 
Illinois Univ. of miDois U/C Pennsylvania Pennsylvania State Univ. 
Indiana Indiana Univ. at Blooinington Rhode Island Univ. of Rhode Manri 
Iowa Iowa State Univ. S. Carolina Univ. of S. Carolina 
Kansas Univ. of Kansas S. Dakota S. Dakota State Univ. 
Kentucky Univ. of Kentucky Tennessee Univ. of Tennessee at Knoxville 
Louisiana Louisiana State Univ. A&M Texas Univ. of Texas at Austin 
Maine Univ. of Mame Orono Utah Univ. of Utah 
Maryland Univ. of Nbtyland College Fade Vermont Univ. of Vermont 
Massachusetts Univ. of Massachusetts Amherst Vugmia Virgmia Polytech. 
Michigan Michigan State Univ. Washington Univ. of Washington 
Minnesota Univ. of Minnesota Twm Cities W. Virgmia W. Virginia Univ. 
Mississ i^ Mississ i^ State Univ. Wisconsm Univ. of Wisconsm at Madison 
Missouri Univ. of Missouri at Cohimbia Wyoming Univ. of Wyoming 
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Table A2: Means and standard deviations of the data (in levels) used in MLE regressions 
Coefficient Nonresident Resident 
First-time enrollment 22.74 42.04 
(76.73) (70.21) 
Total Undergraduate Enrollment 74.69 16330 
(258.55) (282.89) 
j^ )pIications for Admission 112% 65.82 
(265.97) (109.14) 
Income per capita 17^20.82 16,970.00 
(U07.45) (1,933.57) 
College over High School Salary 1.51 1.64 
(0.17) (0.17) 
Primary Spending 2906.63 
(1848.74) 
High school graduates 51521 398.33 
(51579) (527.77) 
ISU tuition 3389.96 1953.25 
(2198.39) (323.64) 
Distance to ISU 898.29 92.43 
(607.58) (35.64) 
Alumni U59 
(1,790) 
Alternative public tuition 1680.52 890.94 
(NR; own-state and Res: 2 yr.) (768.76) (161.89) 
Distance to U of I 128.82 
(66.48) 
State Subsidy 5.12 
(3.51) 
Time Trend 11.68 11.50 
(1.78) (6.34) 
i 
JL 
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APPENDIX B 
DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL ANALYSIS VARIABLES 
•ISU Tuitioii: Same as aggregate study 
•ISU Distance; Same as aggregate study. 
•Own-state tuition: Same as aggregate study. 
•U of I Distance: Same as aggregate study using Iowa City  ^as base. 
•Local Subsidy: Same as aggregate study. 
•Coun  ^Income: Per c i^ta personal income, by county (converted to 1994 dollars). 
Same as aggregate study. 
•Parents Adjusted Gross Income: Financial aid plications (converted to 1994 dollars). 
PAGI = 
PAGI if lepoited 
0 ifmissing 
niiss_pagi = 
1 ifPAGInusstng 
0 if PAGI reported 
•Parents Alumni: Admissions records. 
1 ifyes 
0 ifno or missing 
{1 ifmissing 0 otherwise 
Palum 
ACT Composite Test Score: Admission records. 
Class Rank: Admission records (100 = top of class). 
•Female: Admission records 
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•Minority: Admission records 
minority = 
Miss_ minority = 
1 if ethnic minority 
0 if withheld or missing 
1 if missing 
0 otherwise 
•Predicted Grant Aid; The following regression predicted the grant aid (in real terms) for 
all financial aid ^ iplicants. 
Table B.l: OLS Regression results for the grant award prediction equation. 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -1,110.78**» -2.90 
Rank 1.62** 2.10 
Miss_Rank 873.80* 1.95 
ACT Test 68.59«** 21.14 
Miss_ACT 1,733.69**» 18.41 
Female 75.1 3.38 
Minority 1,103.26**» 21.61 
Missjethnic code -239.71»»» -5.18 
Resident -13.01 -0.41 
Real Student Need 0.307*** 85.12 
Real Family Contribution 0.028*»* 11.56 
Real Parents AGI -0.006*** -11.46 
Real County bcome -0.140** -2.00 
Miss_Parents AGI -15.88 -0.12 
Parents Alumni 33U99*** 7.77 
Miss_Parents Alumni 408.1 !••• 8.71 
Age -14.45 -1.60 
ISU Distance 0.388»»» 5.65 
TotalGrant/Numbo* of Fin. Aid .^ ip's 0.871** 2.38 
(TotalGrant/Number of Fin. Aid App's)  ^ -0.000292** -2.39 
TotalGrant/Total Need -556.97 -1.00 
(TotalGrant/Total Need)  ^ 724.99»» 2.00 
•College/High School Salary: College overhigh school salary, adjusting for 4 extra years 
of labor force participation (using the 1 year Treasury Bill rate) and the probability of being 
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employed without a college degree (unemployment rate of 18 - 19 year olds). Salary 
measures as defined in the aggregate study. 
College Salary 
High Salary 
- f—]1 U + TBilL/ 
1 (l + TBilJ , 
(l-unempL rate) 
•ACT College Choice: Admission records. Reports the student's ranking of ISU in the 
colleges that the student is sending their ACT test scores. The range is 1 to 7, where 1 is 
most favorable, 7 is least &vorable. If missing, CChoice = 7 and dummy variables = 1, else 
dummy variable = 0. 
i: 
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Table B.2: Mean and Standard Deviatioiis of data used in the probit analysis. 
Variable Resident Nonresident Resident Nonreside 
(Admissions)' (Admissions)  ^ (Financial ^mancia 
Aidf Aid)'^  
ISU Tuition/1,000 1.902 5.638 2.132 6.955 
(.297) (1.518) (^31) (.872) 
ISU Grant Aid/1,000 1.748 2.822 
(Predicted) (0.488) (1.599) 
ISU Distance/1,000 0.088 0.362 0.091 0.343 
(0.082) (0.321) (0.088) (0.304) 
Alternative 1.215 2.024 1.210 2.514 
tuition/1,000 (0.111) (0.684) (0.056) (0.560) 
U of I Distance/1,000 0.117 0.119 
(0.066) (0.067) 
Local subsidy/100 0.082 0.103 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Income/10,000 1.794 2.177 2.610 2.485 
(0227) (0.424) (3.121) (3.417) 
CoIlege/HS Salary 0.525 0.546 0.573 0.583 
(0.092) (0.079) (0.027) (0.028) 
ACT/100 0.238 0.206 0.242 0.219 
(0.057) (0.098) (0.051) (0.090) 
ACT Missing 0.029 0.161 0.019 0.120 
(0.168) (0.367) (0.135) (0.325) 
Rank/100 0.759 0.766 0.774 0.799 
(0.177) (0.176) (0.170) (0.167) 
Rank Missing 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0004 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.0208) 
Female 0.449 0.410 0.450 0.413 
(0.497) (0.492) (0.498) (0.492) 
Minority 0.018 0.121 0.029 0.208 
(0.134) (0.327) (0.169) (0.406) 
Miss Minority 0.407 0.312 0.020 0.017 
(0.491) (0.463) (0.139) (0.129) 
Parents Alumni 0.080 0.052 0.141 0.101 
(0212) (0.221) (0.348) (0.301) 
Miss Alunmi 0.598 0.524 0.274 0.155 
(0.490) (0.499) (0.446) (0.362) 
College Choice 6.212 6.564 5.619 5.994 
(1.945) (1.423) (2.414) (2.030) 
Miss College Choice 0.856 0.910 0.748 0.793 
(0.351) (0.287) (0.434) (0.405) 
n 81307 50027 25536 13872 
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Table B.3: Elasticites and standard errors, using a parametric bootstrap of 100 draws. 
Variable Resident 
(Admissions)' 
Nonresident 
(Admissions)  ^
Resident 
(Financial 
Aid)  ^
Nonresident 
financial 
Aid)'^  
ISU Tuition/1,000 -0.230 -0.674 -0.238 -0.704 
(0.051) (0.101) (0.095) (0.272) 
ISU Giant Aid/1,000 0.019 0.117 
(Predicted) (0.017) (0.025) 
ISU Distance/1,000 -0.015 -0.111 -0.003 -0.026 
(0.006) (0.008)) (0.004) (0.0159) 
Alternative 0.058 0.127 0.041 
tuition/1,000 (0.033) (0.150) (0.081) 
U of I Distance/1,000 -0.003 -0.020 
(0.004) (0.007) 
Local subsidy/100 0.195 0.010 
(0.035) (0.072) 
bicome/l 0,000 -0.006 -0.091 0.082 0.064 
(0.022) (0.036) (0.003) (0.009) 
College/HS Salary -0.188 -0.707 -0.468 -2.735 
(0.026) (0.062) (0.115) (0.327) 
ACT/100 0.045 -0.148 -0.184 -0.180 
(0.020) (0.036) (0.029) (0.082) 
Rank/100 -0.039 -0.558 -0.101 -0.639 
(0.012) (0.030) (0.024) (0.066) 
Female -0.029 -0.033 -0.014 -0.017 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0-011) 
Minority -0.002 -0.019 -0.002 -0.026 
(0.0003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) 
Parents Alumni 0.010 0.015 0.006 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
College Choice -1.454 -1.556 -1.138 -1.023 
(0.052) (0.118) (0.051) (0.150) 
Table 5.1 Column 1. 
 ^Table 5.1 Column 2. 
 ^Table 5.2 Column 1. 
* Table 5.2 Column 2. 
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